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 1 
Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to 
Protect Public Parkland from Visual 
Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep? 
Hope Babcock* 
“The health of the eye seems to demand a horizon. We are never tired, so 
long as we can see far enough.”1 
 
This Article asks whether the public trust doctrine should be applied to 
stop the construction of a multistory commercial building that will tower over 
the tree line of Palisades Interstate Park. The building, which received a 
variance from a local New Jersey zoning commission, will ruin views of the 
Park, particularly from scenic overlooks across the Hudson River in New York, 
like the Metropolitan Museum’s Cloisters and the George Washington Bridge. 
To make this argument, the author draws on the work of renowned public trust 
scholars, Professors Joseph Sax and Carol Rose, among others. Based on the 
doctrine’s adaptability to modern conditions, she finds a sufficient bridge from 
traditional uses of the doctrine to justify concluding that the proposed 
building’s interference with scenic views of the Park is an alienation of a trust 
resource in breach of the doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two years ago, a large multinational corporation received approval from a 
local New Jersey town to construct an eight-story office building that would 
tower over Palisades Interstate Park’s tree line.2 Congress designated the Park a 
National Historic Landmark in 1965 and a National Natural Landmark in 1983, 
and the Department of Interior added it to the Register of National Historic 
Places in 1984.3 The new building will not only be visible from inside the Park 
and along Palisades Parkway, which transverses the Park, but also from various 
scenic overlooks on the other side of the Hudson River, including the Cloisters, 
which is part of the Metropolitan Museum system, and Fort Tryon Park.4 
Although the proposal generated fierce opposition from national and state 
environmental and historic preservation organizations, local mayors, and four 
former governors of New Jersey, both the Englewood Cliffs’ town zoning 
commission5 and a New Jersey Superior Court6 approved it. Neither the 
commission nor the court mentioned the proposed building’s impact on scenic 
views of the Park, although the record before both authorities contained 
considerable information on those impacts.7 However, of interest to this 
Article, neither the comments nor the briefs filed in the litigation mentioned the 
public trust doctrine and its potential application to the dispute. Perhaps this is 
 
 2.  Proposed Brief for the State of New York as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 3, 
Jacoby v. Bd. of Adjustment, No. A-000259-13T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter 
Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New York], available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/ 
Palisades_amicus_brief_final.pdf. 
 3.  Brief for New Jersey Conservation Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants 
at 13–14, N.J. State Fed’n of Women’s Clubs v. Bd. of Adjustment, No. A-000007-13T1 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Apr. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Amici Curiae Brief for N.J. Conservation Found. et al.], 
available at http://blog.preservationleadershipforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Palisades-
Brief.pdf. 
 4.  See Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New York, supra note 2, at 2 (mentioning the 
Cloisters Museum, Fort Tryon Park, Riverside Park, and the Henry Hudson Parkway). For more on the 
opposition from the Metropolitan Museum, see Robin Pogrebin, A Timeless View from the Cloisters 
Faces a Modern Intrusion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/arts/ 
design/the-cloisters-view-is-threatened-by-lg-electronics-offices.html (reporting that the museum had 
sent a letter “wish[ing] they would reconsider the design and perhaps come up with a plan that doesn’t 
pierce the treetops on the Palisades”).  
 5.  See Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New York, supra note 2, at 3. 
 6.  See id.  
 7.  Id. at 14. 
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not surprising; the doctrine’s use in this instance would be a substantial step 
away from its historic provenance, which is largely tethered to water-based 
resources and their traditional uses, such as navigation and fishing.8 
This Article argues that this next step should be taken. Applying the 
common law doctrine of public trust to protect scenic views of trust resources 
like parklands is consistent with the doctrine’s gap-filling role and malleable 
nature.9 The situation in New Jersey illustrates Professor Mary Christina 
Wood’s concern that “[t]he ancient membrane of law that functions as a system 
of community restraint is pitted with holes”10 because no environmental law 
squarely addresses the issue at hand. The local zoning commission’s actions 
demonstrate Professor Wood’s complaint that “agency discretion has been 
largely commandeered to serve industry and bureaucratic interests that operate 
at cross-purposes to the protective goals of the statutes that authorize such 
discretion. At best, environmental law today is used to hospice a dying 
planet.”11 
To support the thesis that protecting parks from visual intrusions is an 
application within the bounds of the public trust doctrine, the Article begins 
with a brief history of Palisades Interstate Park and the proposal that triggered 
this analysis, then it summarizes the key elements of the public trust doctrine 
and the rationales behind its use. The Article subsequently demonstrates the 
doctrine’s flexibility by charting its emergence from tidelands to dry lands and 
its evolution from traditional uses, like navigation and fishing, to more modern 
non-water-based uses, like hiking, bird watching, and scientific research. The 
fourth Part of the Article links traditional uses of the doctrine with its 
application to protect scenic views of trust resources, first by exploring the 
relevance of aesthetics to the doctrine, then by showing that interfering with the 
aesthetic enjoyment of a trust resource is comparable with preventing access to 
that resource. Lastly, the Article concludes that the public trust doctrine is a 
viable tool for those interested in preserving the scenic vistas of trust resources, 
such as those that grace Palisades Interstate Park, despite criticisms of the 
doctrine’s extension. 
 
 8.  See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (concluding that state title to lands 
under navigable waters is “held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy navigation of the 
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have the liberty of fishing therein”); see also Hope M. 
Babcock, Has the United States Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence? 
The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 36–54 (1995) (discussing the public trust doctrine’s evolution in this country). 
Public trust scholars like James Huffman, however, criticize this doctrinal creep. See James L. Huffman, 
Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y 
F. 1, 8–99 (2007) (challenging the predominant historical account of the public trust doctrine’s origins). 
 9.  See generally Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Ride ‘Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007) (discussing regulatory gaps in the 
management of ocean fish ranching and how the public trust doctrine has been used to fill them). 
 10.  Mary Christina Wood, “You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle”: Environmental Law for a New 
Ecological Age, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 176 (2010).  
 11.  Id. at 209. 
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In light of species extinction, global warming, and other environmental 
catastrophes facing the world, protecting the views of a relatively small park on 
the banks of an urban river may seem too small to be worth the worry.12 But 
keeping an undisturbed natural system intact by protecting it from visual 
pollution that would otherwise fundamentally change the enjoyment rights of 
people who view it seems a worthwhile, even attainable goal in a world of 
over-cluttered horizons; moreover, this task is particularly well suited as an 
application of the public trust doctrine. 
I. BACKGROUND: PALISADES PARK, LG ELECTRONICS’ PROPOSAL, 
AND THE ENSUING LITIGATION13 
[I]f built, this tower will introduce a massive incompatible feature that will 
be visible for miles along the river and from vantage points along the west 
side of Manhattan as well as from the bridge.14 
Palisades Interstate Park covers twelve miles of steep cliffs that stretch 
from the George Washington Bridge in New Jersey into New York State.15 The 
Park encompasses 2500 acres of wild shore lands, uplands, and dramatic cliffs 
that run alongside the Hudson River.16 Except for a historic brick church that 
sits below the Park’s tree line, there are no buildings in the Park.17 New York 
and New Jersey created the Park in 1900 to protect the cliffs from unregulated 
quarrying and to preserve the view from the New York shoreline.18 The Park is 
managed by the Palisades Interstate Park Commission.19 A parkway, built in 
1961, runs for over forty miles from New Jersey into New York, providing 
both access to and scenic views of the Park for residents and out-of-state 
visitors.20 Both states have designated the parkway a “state scenic byway . . . 
because of its outstanding historic and scenic character.”21 Local communities 
 
 12.  Id. at 180 (“On a worldwide basis, there is a staggering loss in ecosystem services provided to 
humans. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, conducted by over 1,300 experts from 95 countries, 
concludes: ‘[A]pproximately 60% (15 out of 24) of the ecosystem services examined . . . are being 
degraded or used unsustainably.’”), 177 (“The data and trends are impossible to dismiss. Humanity is 
violating nature’s laws not only at the level of individual species and ecosystems, but at the level of 
atmospheric functioning and ocean health—a truly global level.”). 
 13.  See generally Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New York, supra note 2, at 3 (listing 
supporting facts). Other sources are separately noted. 
 14.  Robin Pogrebin, New Forces Join Lawsuit Fighting Palisades Tower, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/arts/design/new-forces-join-lawsuit-fighting-palisades-
tower.html?_r=0 (discussing letters sent from the National Park Service to the Englewood Cliffs 
Planning Board). 
 15.  Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New York, supra note 2, at 4–6. 
 16.  Id. at 4. 
 17.  Id. at 4 n.2. 
 18.  John D. Rockefeller donated 700 acres of land across the top of the cliffs to the Park on the 
condition that no structure would be built at a height that would be visible from across the river. Id. at 6. 
He also conditioned his gift on the removal of all man-made structures that were visible from across the 
river. Id.  
 19.  Id. at 5. 
 20.  See id. at 6. 
 21.  Id. at 7. 
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adjacent to the Park have imposed zoning and land use restrictions, in particular 
height restrictions, to protect the Park from despoliation and to preserve views 
of the Park from various vantage points in both New Jersey and New York.22 
The town of Englewood Cliffs, which is at the center of this dispute, has a 
zoning ordinance that limits the height of buildings in commercial areas to 
thirty-five feet.23 Until recent action by the Englewood Cliffs’ zoning 
commission, none of the local towns adjacent to the Park had granted any 
variance that allowed buildings to exceed this limit.24 
In 2012, LG Electronics, a South Korean manufacturer of televisions,25 
mobile phones, and appliances, received a zoning variance to construct a 143-
foot office building adjacent to the Park.26 The building will “tower” over the 
Park’s tree line and be visible not only from Palisades Parkway, but also from 
important public viewing sites on the other side of the Hudson River,27 
including the Cloisters in New York City.28 The building has drawn opposition 
from national environmental and historic preservation groups, four former 
governors of New Jersey, four mayors of surrounding towns, New York State, 
 
 22.  For example, Tenafly, which is located north of Englewood Cliffs, has a zoning ordinance 
that limits the height of buildings to thirty feet (the equivalent of two-and-a-half stories) in residential 
districts and forty feet (or three stories) in commercial districts. Id. at 8. The zoning ordinance for 
Alpine, north of Tenafly, limits building height to thirty-five feet. Id. Both of these ordinances “have 
preserved the majestic views of the Palisades’ summit from the eastern side of the Hudson River for 
decades.” Id. 
 23.  Id. at 7. 
 24.  Id. at 8. 
 25.  See David Voreacos, LG Wins New Jersey Court’s Approval to Build atop Hudson Cliffs, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-09/lg-wins-new-
jersey-court-approval-to-build-on-hudson-cliffs.html (reporting that LG Electronics is second only in 
size to Samsung Electronics with respect to producing televisions). 
 26.  The new building will be less than sixty yards from the Park’s border. Press Release, N.J. 
Conservation Found., Major Opponents of LG Tower Join Legal Battle to Protect Palisades Park (Apr. 
7, 2014), available at http://www.njconservation.org/pressreleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?prid=110. 
The first lawsuit opposed the grant of the variance. Pogrebin, supra note 14. But, after authorities 
permitted the land in question to be rezoned to allow the taller building, advocates filed the second 
lawsuit. Id. 
 27.  Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New York, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that the building 
will be “highly visible in every season from the George Washington Bridge and the eastern shore of the 
Hudson River”). 
 28.  See Amici Curiae Brief for N.J. Conservation Found. et al., supra note 3, at 16; see also 
Brendan T. Byrne et al., Op-Ed., The Threat to the Palisades, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/opinion/the-threat-to-the-palisades.html (noting that four former 
governors commented critically about the proposed building); Editorial Bd., LG’s Plan to Deface the 
Palisades, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/opinion/lgs-plan-to-
deface-the-palisades.html (“Four former governors of New Jersey––two Democrats and two 
Republicans––have pleaded with the company and local officials to reduce the size of the building. 
Virtually every major public official in New York, including the governor and both senators, have 
protested. The Environmental Protection Agency withdrew its approval of the construction last year 
because the main office building would damage the ‘natural beauty of the Palisades.’”); Press Release, 
Protect the Palisades, 11 Organizations, NJ and NY Elected Officials File Legal Briefs Opposing LG’s 
Tower (Apr. 7, 2014), available at http://www.protectthepalisades.org/11_organizations_and_officials_ 
from_nj_and_ny_file_legal_briefs_opposing_lg_s_tower (reporting that four New Jersey mayors, 
including the mayors of Alpine and Tenafly, had filed amicus briefs opposing the building). 
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and the Metropolitan Museum, among others.29 According to opponents of the 
project, the building would breach a century-old agreement between the former 
governors of New York (Theodore Roosevelt) and New Jersey (Foster 
Voorhees).30 Even the National Park Service wrote a letter asking the 
Englewood Cliffs Planning Board to reconsider the proposal, saying that the 
new building would “threaten the integrity of the scene in a startling and major 
way.”31 
Despite this opposition, the request for a zoning variance to allow the 
building’s construction won easy approval from Englewood Cliffs’ zoning 
commission; and the New Jersey Superior Court later sustained the decision.32 
The commission’s decision is unsurprising because local agencies are 
frequently subject to substantial political pressure,33 causing them to favor 
parochial interests by converting trust resources to commercial use and 
overriding the broader public interest in preserving trust property.34 The casual 
issuance of the variance by the zoning commission only underscores the 
importance of Professor Wood’s call for repositioning public trust principles in 
a new “Nature’s Trust,”35 which would “interject a fiduciary duty into every 
government action involving the environment.”36 
 
 29.  See generally Amici Curiae Brief for N.J. Conservation Found. et al., supra note 3 (listing 
some of the groups opposed to the building). 
 30.  Id. at 23 (stating that “the work of such storied historical actors and cooperation between New 
Jersey and New York should not be so easily undone” and noting the National Park Service’s 
recognition of the Park as “one of the key moments in conservation history”). 
 31.  Pogrebin, supra note 14. The Times noted that the World Monument Fund featured the 
Cloisters and Palisades on its annual list of endangered cultural sites, saying that the proposed building 
“would seriously affect one of the most unspoiled areas of the Hudson River, including treasured views 
from the Cloisters museum and gardens, and also have a negative impact on the region.” Id. The 
National Trust for Historic Preservation listed the Park among its most endangered historic places in 
2014 because it was an example of a natural heritage “at risk of destruction or irreparable damage.” 
Robin Pogrebin, Preservation Trust Lists Palisades, Wright Home and Remnant of the Slave Trade as 
Endangered, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/ 
preservation-trust-lists-palisades-wright-home-and-slave-ship-as-endangered. 
 32.  See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
 33.  Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 495 (1970) (“[P]ublic officials are frequently subjected to intensive 
representations on behalf of interests seeking official concessions to support proposed enterprises. The 
concessions desired by those interests are often of limited visibility to the general public so that public 
sentiment is not aroused . . . .”).  
 34.  See id. at 534 (“The San Francisco Bay experiences indicate that local public interests may 
interfere with the public trust in the same manner as private profit-oriented interests; many aspects of 
local self-interest are as inconsonant with the broad public interest as are the projects of private 
enterprises. In both situations one may observe behavior which is rational from the atomistic perspective 
of the actor, but which, from the perspective of the larger community, is highly disadvantageous.”); id. 
(“[These experiences] suggest[ ] the need to adjust traditional decision-making mechanisms for 
resources like the bay in light of the potential disjunction between the perceived benefit to the local 
entity and the total impact of such local choices on the community of users as a whole.”). Sax’s survey 
of court public trust decisions revealed “a broad consideration of all potential public interests by 
requiring that decisions be made by a body with a constituency broad enough to be responsive to the 
whole range of significant potential users.” Id. at 560–61. 
 35.  Wood, You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra note 10, at 191 (“Rather than using their 
delegated authority to protect crucial resources, nearly all agencies use their permit authority to 
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The former New Jersey governors commented, among other criticisms, 
that “LG would take for its own private benefit natural beauty which belongs to 
the public.”37 An amicus curiae brief filed by nearby local towns added that 
they each regarded the Palisades Park as a part of their “public trust to protect 
the watershed” and that they and their residents considered the Park and its 
cliffs to be “critical elements” of the surrounding area, “not only providing 
recreational opportunities, but also creating a sense of place that enriches their 
communities.”38 Although these comments resonate with language usually 
attributed to the public trust doctrine, none of the comments or principal briefs 
recommended the doctrine’s use to block the building’s construction. Their 
failure to do so thus invites the question of whether the doctrine should be used 
to protect the scenic views of a public park––a question that this Article 
attempts to answer in the positive. 
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE:  
ITS ORIGINS AND TRADITIONAL USE 
The public trust . . . is based on a set of modest beliefs: a belief that the 
public benefits mightily from private development, but that the public 
interest is in fact greater than the sum of the private interests; a belief that 
property ownership must be profoundly respected but that property rights in 
water, like rights in land, are not absolute but rather can be regulated and 
adjusted in reasonable ways for the good of the citizenry as a whole; a 
belief that wasteful uses of public resources are wrong and are not excused 
by return flows that return to our rivers not just water but also silt, salts, 
agrichemicals, and temperature changes; a belief that our rivers and 
canyons are more than commodities, that they have a trace of the sacred; a 
belief that words like ‘trust’ ought to be taken seriously.39 
 
affirmatively sanction destruction of resources by private interests.”), 200 (“The Nature’s Trust 
paradigm draws upon an ancient and enduring principle known as the public trust doctrine. The doctrine 
springs from an early civic and judicial understanding that some natural resources are so vital to public 
welfare and human survival that they cannot be exclusively exploited through private property 
ownership and control. The public has a lasting ownership interest, called a beneficial interest, in such 
crucial natural resources––a right so fundamental that it has been described by some scholars as a God-
given right or natural right.”); see also Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land 
Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 299 (1980) (“Thus we can expect courts today, like courts in earlier 
eras, to characterize Congress’ modern legislative scheme as imposing a public trust on the public 
resources.”). 
 36.  Wood, You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra note 10, at 202 (“While the environmental 
statutes give agencies authority to allocate rights to pollute and destroy resources, the trust would act as, 
and be enforced as, a fundamental check on this authority.”). 
 37.  Press Release, N.J. Conservation Found., supra note 26. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 
19 ENVTL. L. 425, 471–72 (1989). Professor Wood has put forth a much bolder view of the trust, 
describing it as “the original legal mechanism used to ensure that government safeguards the natural 
resources necessary for public welfare and survival.” Wood, You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra 
note 10, at 200. 
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Much has been written about the public trust doctrine since its 1970 
redeployment by the late Professor Joseph Sax,40 and it is not the intent of this 
Article to repeat the work of others here. However, certain elements of the 
traditional doctrine relate to the question posed by this Article and are, 
therefore, discussed briefly in those contexts. 
The public trust doctrine is based on the proposition that the sovereign 
holds certain common properties in trust in perpetuity for the free and 
unimpeded use of the general public.41 As a result, the public trust doctrine 
requires first that: 
[P]roperty subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, 
but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the 
property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third, the 
property must be maintained for particular types of uses.42 
Thus, the doctrine protects public rights in trust resources in perpetuity and 
prevents the government and private individuals from alienating or otherwise 
adversely affecting those rights in all but another equivalent public purpose.43 
Under the doctrine, governments are not only prohibited from conveying trust 
resources into private hands or allowing their destruction, they “have an 
affirmative, ongoing duty to safeguard the long-term preservation of those 
resources for the benefit of the general public.”44 This makes the doctrine “a 
fundamental limitation on governmental power,”45 and the beneficiaries “are 
present and future generations of citizens.”46 The essence of the doctrine 
requires trust management for public benefit rather than for private exploitation 
or political advantage.47 This places a duty on trustees to choose less acute 
 
 40.  See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33. 
 41.  See Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 351 
(1998) (“Until it was revived and re-invented by Sax, the doctrine held that some resources, particularly 
lands beneath navigable waters or washed by the tides, are either inherently the property of the public at 
large, or are at least subject to a kind of inherent easement for certain public purposes. Those purposes 
are foremost navigation and travel, to a lesser extent fishing, and lesser still recreation and public 
gatherings.”). 
 42.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 477. 
 43.  Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where the Wild 
Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things that Go Bump in the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 
849, 889–98 (2000) (summarizing salient aspects of the public trust doctrine); see also Mary Christina 
Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust: A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 34 
ENVTL. L. 605, 612 (2004) (“[G]overnment trustees are required to preserve wildlife assets and protect 
them against damage.”). 
 44.  Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its 
Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 667 (2012); see also J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, 
Legislation, and Green Property: A Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 918 (2012) 
(“Public trust rights are understood to precede and constrain legislative action to a larger extent than do 
private property rights.”). 
 45.  Wood, You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra note 10, at 201; see also Wood, Protecting 
the Wildlife Trust, supra note 43, at 612 (noting that this capacity to “constrain the natural tendency of 
governmental officials to exhaust resources in the present generation” acts as “a normative anchor . . . 
geared towards sustaining society for generations to come”).  
 46.  Wood, You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra note 10, at 201. 
 47.  Id. 
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intrusions into resources in order to protect them from “avoidable 
destabilization and disruption.”48 There were certainly options for less acute 
intrusions into the scenic views of Palisades Interstate Park had the zoning 
commission required them. Those options would not have compromised LG’s 
desire to receive a Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design (LEED) 
certification—which would have made the company eligible for certain state 
tax incentives.49 
Public access to public trust resources is at the core of the doctrine.50 
Because granting absolute private dominion over property impressed with the 
public trust interferes with public access, it can never be granted unless the 
public interest is served in doing so.51 Unrestricted public access to trust 
resources is the key issue in this Article. 
Government agencies have the non-rescindable power to revoke uses of 
trust resources that are inconsistent with the doctrine.52 This power is 
equivalent to an easement that permanently burdens trust resources with an 
overriding public interest in their preservation.53 
 
 48.  Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 185, 193 (1981) (discussing impacts to water-based resources like bottomlands); see also Wood, 
You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra note 10, at 188 (“The dual necessity of mitigation and 
adaptation is perhaps best captured by Thomas Friedman when he says: ‘Avoid the unmanageable and 
manage the unavoidable.’”). 
 49.  For example, LG apparently ignored testimony by the project’s architect that the building 
could be wider without losing it environmental features and still qualify for LEED certification. Amicus 
Curiae Brief for the State of New York, supra note 2, at 10–11. Despite LG’s claims to “greenness,” 
Greenpeace reported that it ranked twelfth out of sixteen companies in energy consumption for its 
electronic products. See GREENPEACE INT’L, GUIDE TO GREENER ELECTRONICS (2012), available at 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/campaigns/climate-change/cool-it/Campaign-analysis/ 
Guide-to-Greener-Electronics. 
 50.  See Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include 
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 731 (1989) (“In essence, the courts protect access rights to 
public trust resources.”); id. at 734 (“The public trust doctrine is a transcendent legal principle. . . . 
[with] roots . . . in natural law.”).  
 51.  See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435, 452–54 (1892); see also United States v. 
1.58 Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120, 122–23 (D. Mass. 1981) (“Historically, no developed western 
civilization has recognized absolute rights of private ownership in [submerged] land as a means of 
allocating this scarce and precious resource among the competing public demands. Though private 
ownership was permitted in the Dark Ages, neither Roman law nor the English common law as it 
developed after the signing of the Magna Charta would permit it.”). Sax attributes the creation of a 
“model for judicial skepticism” to Illinois Central. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource 
Law, supra note 33, at 491. The model:  
[P]oses a set of relevant standards for current, less dramatic instances of dubious 
governmental conduct. For instance, a court should look skeptically at programs which 
infringe broad public uses in favor of narrower ones. Similarly, there should be a special 
burden of justification on government when such results are brought into question. 
Id.  
 52.  Babcock, supra note 43, at 892.  
 53.  Id. at 893 (“One cannot construct a common law canon more offensive to the notion of 
absolute private rights in property than the public trust doctrine.”). But see Byrne, supra note 44, at 916 
(finding two aspects to the doctrine, one pertaining to public right of use or access to trust resources and 
the other to the requirement that public officials take into account the public interest in natural resources 
when allocating private rights in those resources). 
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[A state] can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
people are interested . . . so as to leave them entirely under the use and 
control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police powers in the 
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.54  
The doctrine also applies to municipalities, like the town of Englewood 
Cliffs.55 
This is not to say that public trust resources can never be alienated. As 
Professor Sax said, “It can hardly be the basis of any sensible legal doctrine 
that change itself is illegitimate.”56 Preventing conversion of trust resources to 
nontrust uses would tie the hands of decision makers from responding to 
changing perceptions of the public interest with respect to the use of trust 
resources.57 Thus, lands impressed with the public trust can be transferred to 
private owners, if the conveyance will serve the public interest in those 
resources and not interfere with trust uses in the nonconveyed land.58 But 
private uses of trust resources are allowed only if those uses are consistent with 
the trust’s purposes, do not interfere with protected uses of those resources, and 
 
 54.  Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. The public trust doctrine does not “sanction the abdication of 
the general control of the [s]tate over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a 
sea or lake.” Id. at 452–53.  
 55.  See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(applying the public trust doctrine to a county); Save the Welwood Murray Mem’l Library Comm. v. 
City Council, 263 Cal. Rptr. 896 (Ct. App. 1989) (discussed in the following Part, applying the doctrine 
to a city); Friends of Parks v. Chi. Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161 (Ill. 2003) (finding that state statute did 
not violate public trust doctrine); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1978) (striking 
down a restriction limiting membership to a municipally owned beach and casino to residents); Borough 
of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972) (striking down discriminatory 
fees charged at a municipally owned beach); Bernstein v. City of Pittsburgh, 77 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1951); In 
re Conveyance of 1.2 Acres of Bangor Mem’l Park to Bangor Area Sch. Dist., 567 A.2d 750 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1989); City of Montpelier v. Barnett, 49 A.3d 120 (Vt. 2012) (prohibiting city from 
permitting swimming, boating, and fishing on Berlin Pond, the city’s source of drinking water). 
 56.  Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from Its Historical Shackles, supra note 48, at 186 (“[I]t is 
inconceivable that the trust doctrine should be viewed as a rigid prohibition, preventing all dispositions 
of trust property or utterly freezing as of a given moment the uses to which those properties have 
traditionally been put.”). 
 57.  Sax acknowledges this problem as “the central problem of public trust controversies.” Sax, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 495. “There must be some means 
by which a court can keep a check on legislative grants of public lands while ensuring that historical 
uses may be modified to accommodate contemporary public needs and that the power to make such 
modifications resides in a branch of government which is responsive to public demands.” Id.  
 58.  Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (“The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can 
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can 
be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining.”); see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 
709, 724 (Cal. 1983) (“The public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property 
for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common 
heritage[,] . . . surrendering that right . . . only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is 
consistent with the purpose of the trust.”). The public purpose that will be served by a conveyance of 
trust lands cannot be “incidental, remote or secondary.” Tim Eichenberg & Barbara Vestal, Improving 
the Legal Framework for Marine Aquaculture: The Role of Water Quality Laws and the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 2 TERRITORIAL SEA J. 339, 349 (1992).  
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preserve them for future as well as present generations.59 None of these 
exceptions matter in this case. Moreover, the conveyance becomes suspicious 
when profit-making ventures “obtain advantages which infringe directly on 
public uses and promote private profits.”60 Here, the alienation of trust 
resources benefits only LG Electronics and its employees.61 
Some courts will allow the conveyance of trust resources into private 
hands if the conveying government agency has considered the proposed 
activity’s potential adverse impacts to the public trust and has concluded that 
the impacts on remaining trust resources are minor.62 Other courts balance 
competing interests when conflicts arise over the use of trust property;63 still 
others simply allow conveyances to private hands, if they are legislatively 
authorized.64 While courts use different standards when determining whether a 
particular transfer of trust resources to private ownership is permissible, all 
courts look at the transfer closely to determine if the private use would 
diminish the land’s usefulness for public trust purposes.65 
Professor William Araiza likes none of these approaches, particularly 
when courts are faced with a nontraditional use of the doctrine, like the one 
 
 59.  Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. 
 60.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 496.  
 61.  See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New York, supra note 2, at 10 (reporting that 
the project architect explained that the height of the building was “to provide more daylight for the 
building’s occupants, thereby boosting employee happiness and retention,” and noting that other 
witnesses “remarked on how the building’s height would provide all LG employees with views outside” 
and that the building was “‘one of the most magnificent views in Bergen County’”). 
 62.  Deborah G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust and Parens Patriae Doctrines: Protecting 
Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 87, 98 (1995) (noting that courts allow 
actions in derogation of the public trust “to proceed only if the impacts are minimal or necessary”); see 
also Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435, 453 (imposing a duty on states to prevent “substantial impairment” 
of trust resources).  
 63.  See Musiker et al., supra note 62, at 98 (noting that some courts “have advocated more of a 
balancing approach”); see also Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728 (“This is not a case in which the Legislature, 
the Water Board, or any judicial body has determined that the needs of Los Angeles outweigh the needs 
of the Mono Basin, that the benefit gained is worth the price. Neither has any responsible body 
determined whether some lesser taking would better balance the diverse interests.”); Babcock, supra 
note 8, at 46 n.261 (discussing balancing under the public trust doctrine). 
 64.  Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 58, at 349 (“[T]rust lands may only be conveyed for 
purposes approved by the legislature as public uses.”); see also Gould v. Greylock Reservation 
Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 123–24 (Mass. 1966) (finding law authorizing commercial lease of state 
reserved land too vague to authorize construction of ski area); Babcock, supra note 8, at 44–45 (noting 
that unless the legislature finds that a proposed conveyance promotes the public interest, a court cannot 
destroy the public’s interest in remaining trust resources). Professor Sax considered Gould an extremely 
important public trust case because the court in that case “devised a legal rule which imposed a 
presumption that the state does not ordinarily intend to divert trust properties in such a manner as to 
lessen public uses.” Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 494. 
 65.  Eichenberg & Vestal, supra note 58, at 349; see also Musiker et al., supra note 62, at 98 
(interpreting Mono Lake as requiring state agencies to consider public trust values before making any 
decision affecting them, to act to preserve those values, and to supervise continually any conduct that 
might affect those values).  
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contemplated by this Article. He proposes instead that courts apply the public 
trust doctrine as “an interpretative canon of construction.”66 He argues: 
[T]he principle underlying the public trust doctrine––that “social” uses of 
natural resources generate benefits that merit protection––is so important 
that it warrants consideration when courts construe laws or review 
government actions that affect those uses. As such, the public trust 
principle constitutes a background principle, or canon, against which those 
laws should be construed.67 
According to Araiza, such a canon invites “judges to place a thumb on the 
scales in favor of public trust assets,” but is not itself a substantive or 
procedural rule.68 However, this approach seems too mild and too great a 
departure from the case law to justify the application of the doctrine to block 
construction of the LG building. Further, there is no law here that might block 
the unfettered discretion of the zoning commission. Hence an interpretative 
canon would be of no use. 
According to Professor Sax, courts generally “look with considerable 
skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to 
reallocate [a public] resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to 
the self-interest of private parties.”69 This is because 
[G]overnments operate in order to provide widely available public services, 
such as schools, police protection, libraries, and parks. While there may be 
good reasons to use governmental resources to benefit some group smaller 
than the whole citizenry, there is usually some relatively obvious reason for 
the subsidy, such as a need to assist the farmer or the urban poor. In 
addition, there is ordinarily some plainly rational basis for the reallocative 
structure of any such program . . . .70 
Courts will also intervene when there is a blatant act of government corruption 
or when the transfer from public to private hands “raise[s] doubts.”71 In his 
review of state court reactions when confronted with a case that raises public 
trust concerns, Professor Sax found that courts also remand cases when doing 
so will “promote equality of political power for a disorganized and diffuse 
majority” where organized and powerful minority interests have held sway.72 
 
 66.  William D. Araiza, The Public Trust Doctrine as an Interpretive Canon, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 693, 703 (2012). 
 67.  Id. at 704 (“[S]uch a canon, however applied, amounts to a call to judges to place a thumb on 
the scales in favor of public trust assets.”). 
 68.  Id. at 726; see also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, 
at 509 (“[P]ublic trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards for dealing with the public 
domain as it is a technique by which courts may mend perceived imperfections in the legislative and 
administrative process.”). 
 69.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 490 (“When a 
state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with 
considerable skepticism upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that 
resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of private parties.”).  
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 542–43. 
 72.  Id. at 560. 
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There is nothing unusual in these court actions, according to Professor Sax, as 
they are functions that courts have been performing all along.73 Given the size 
and economic strength of LG Electronics, there may well be a sufficient 
imbalance of political power in this situation to justify the doctrine’s 
application to restore political balance.74 
Professor Sax believed the doctrine is capable of contributing to intelligent 
resource management.75 However, to “provide a satisfactory tool” to improve 
the management of natural resources, the doctrine must, among other things, 
“be capable of an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns for 
environmental quality.”76 These concerns include the need to avoid 
destabilizing changes, particularly those that are abrupt and do not allow for 
adaption to a new regime.77 This concern is particularly true in matters 
involving ecological systems, where Professor Sax thought that the public trust 
doctrine could create breathing room for natural systems to adapt.78 Indeed, 
Professor Sax’s support for the doctrine flowed, in part, from its capacity to 
prevent destabilizing change.79 Although the construction of LG’s building 
does not destabilize an ecological system, it is an abrupt change in scenic views 
of a century-old intact natural system; thus, it destabilizes expectations about 
what the public might see when it looks at Palisades Interstate Park. 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  According to LG’s own webpage, LG was the fourth largest producer of mobile handsets in 
the world in 2005 and the second largest producer of liquid-crystal-display television products in 2009. 
History, LG ELECTRONICS, http://www.lg.com/us/corporate-information/overview/ 
history (last visited Dec. 28, 2014). 
 75.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 474 (“Of all the 
concepts known to American law, only the public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and 
substantive content which might make it useful as a tool of general application for citizens seeking to 
develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems.”). Indeed, Sax believed that 
recognition of “long-standing public uses have an important place” in any judicial analysis of the 
“justness of property claims,” and he would have had courts “integrate legal doctrine and fundamental 
principles of intelligent resource management, instead of treating basic social decisions as if they were 
merely the province of a title examiner.” Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from Its Historical Shackles, 
supra note 48, at 194. He also believed the doctrine contained “the seeds of ideas whose importance is 
only beginning to be perceived, and that the doctrine might usefully promote needed legal development, 
can hardly be doubted.” Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 485. 
 76.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 474. Sax also said 
the doctrine must “contain some concept of a legal right in the general public” and “it must be 
enforceable against the government.” Id. The doctrine’s historical provenance meets the first 
requirement and at least two centuries of enforcement of the doctrine against government agencies for 
violating the public trust meet the second. See generally Babcock, supra note 8, at 36–54; Babcock, 
supra note 43, at 889–98.  
 77.  Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from Its Historical Shackles, supra note 48, at 188; see also 
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 474 (noting that the public 
trust doctrine has also “prevent[ed] the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but 
without formal recognition such as title”).  
 78.  Sax, Liberating the Public Trust from Its Historical Shackles, supra note 48, at 188; see also 
Wood, You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra note 10, at 177 (“When an ecosystem starts unraveling, 
it takes almost everything with it.”). 
 79.  See supra note 77. 
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Professor Sax also touted the doctrine’s “democratization” of the decision-
making process by forcing legislators and agency officials to publicize their 
decisions compromising the doctrine’s protective capacity.80 He noted that, 
while the doctrine has “no life on its own and no intrinsic content,” it is “a 
name courts give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic 
process.”81 The failure of the commission, in a state with a long history of 
applying the public trust doctrine, to even acknowledge the doctrine’s existence 
is surprising. The commission’s failure certainly deprived the public from 
recognizing how its actions compromised their rights under the doctrine. 
III. THE DOCTRINE’S EVOLUTION BEYOND TRADITIONAL TRUST 
PROPERTIES AND TRADITIONAL USES OF THOSE PROPERTIES 
The new public trust laid claim to the seed of the jus publicum, the notion 
that certain resources are of so common a nature that they defy private 
ownership in the classical liberal sense. But where the traditional doctrine 
evolved to protect common rights to access for commerce purposes (hence 
 
 80.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 498 (“That state’s 
supreme judicial court has penetrated one of the very difficult problems of American government—
inequality of access to, and influence over, administrative agencies. It has struck directly at low-
visibility decision making, which is the most pervasive manifestation of the problem. By a simple but 
ingenious flick of the doctrinal wrist, the court has forced agencies to bear the burden of obtaining 
specific, overt approval of efforts to invade the public trust.” (referring to Gould v. Greylock 
Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966))). According to Sax, this places on administrative 
agencies “the burden of establishing an affirmative case before the legislature in the full light of public 
attention,” something that was clearly not done in the case of Palisades Interstate Park. See id. at 499. 
 81.  Id. at 521. Professor Sax identified multiple steps that courts should follow to determine 
whether a democratization problem exists:  
[The court must first] search for those situations in which political imbalance exists, and 
the signal for the existence of that problem is diffusion. . . . When a claim is made on 
behalf of diffuse public uses, courts take the first step in the process by withdrawing the 
usual presumption that all relevant issues have been adequately considered and resolved 
by routine statutory and administrative processes. That first step is tantamount to a 
court’s acceptance of jurisdiction.  
Id. at 561. The second “step is to seek out the indicia which suggest that a particular case, on its own 
merits, possibly or probably has not been properly handled at the administrative or legislative level.” Id. 
at 562. Indicia of such a problem are the disposal of trust resources at less than fair market value or a 
private entity being granted “authority to make resource-use decisions which may subordinate broad 
public resource uses to that private interest[.]” Id. The third inquiry by a court faced with the potential 
misuse of trust resources is whether there has “been an attempt to reallocate diffuse public uses either to 
private uses or to public uses which have less breadth[.]” Id. at 563. In those cases, Sax remarked that 
while courts seem disinclined to find such transfers “illegal per se,” they will inquire into their public 
purpose justification and appear to “want to put legislatures and administrators on notice that such 
dispositions will be closely scrutinized and must be reasonably justifiable in terms of the public benefits 
to be achieved.” Id. at 564. The reviewing court’s last inquiry is whether the resource is being used for 
“its natural purpose.” Id. at 565. Given the failure of the zoning commission to consider comments 
opposing the grant, the substitution of a narrow public use for a much broader diffuse use of a trust 
resource, and a use that is not natural at all, the variance granted to LG Electronics raises serious 
questions under all these inquiries.  
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the criteria of navigability), the new public trust heralded conservationist 
principles.82 
As befits a doctrine that originates from property law,83 the public trust 
doctrine’s traditional reach is narrow.84 Nonetheless, the doctrine has expanded 
over time, perhaps because property is “inextricably part of a network of 
 
 82.  Erin Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the Public 
Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 479 (2001). 
 83.  See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 83 (1851) (“[W]hether this power be 
traced to the right of property or right of sovereignty as its principle source, it must be regarded as held 
in trust for the best interest of the public . . . .”). Indeed, some well-respected scholars fault the doctrine 
of its property law provenance. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property 
and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 
633 (1986) (“[T]he historical function of the public trust doctrine has been to provide a public property 
basis for resisting the exercise of private property rights in natural resources deemed contrary to the 
public interest. In recent decades, however . . . modern trends in natural resources law increasingly have 
eroded traditional concepts of private property rights in natural resources and substituted new notions of 
sovereign power over these resources. These trends . . . are currently weaving a new fabric for natural 
resources law that is more responsive to current social values and the physical characteristics of the 
resources. By continuing to resist a legal system that is otherwise being abandoned, the public trust 
doctrine obscures analysis and renders more difficult the important process of reworking natural 
resource law.”). Erin Ryan responds to this concern: “One is hard-pressed to challenge the proposition 
that the common law public trust doctrine developed independent from property law, but is it possible 
that the force of the new public trust doctrine, as Professor Sax has implied, flows from roots deeper 
than classical liberal property law?” Ryan, supra note 82, at 495. 
 84.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 556 (“[T]he 
historical scope of public trust law is quite narrow. Its coverage includes, with some variation among the 
states, that aspect of the public domain below the low-water mark on the margin of the sea and the great 
lakes, the waters over those lands, and the waters within rivers and streams of any consequence.”). 
Indeed, Professor Thomas Merrill, in an article on the public dedication doctrine in which he compares 
the effectiveness of that relic doctrine to the public trust doctrine, lists the wider scope of the dedication 
doctrine as a distinct advantage over the public trust doctrine. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. 
Merrill, Private Rights in Public Lands: The Chicago Lakefront, Montgomery Ward, and the Public 
Dedication Doctrine, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1417, 1522 (2011) (“[T]he public dedication doctrine covers a 
much wider array of resources. . . . In virtually all states, the public trust doctrine remains tethered to 
navigable waters, and courts have resisted extending the doctrine to public lands having no nexus to 
navigable waters. The public dedication doctrine, in contrast, applies to any and all lands that have been 
dedicated to public uses, including streets, alleys, squares, landings, and parks.”). Professor Merrill notes 
that the public trust doctrine “is mired in uncertainty about what kind of nexus to navigable waters is 
required (if any), and what kinds of trust obligations are imposed on the state when the doctrine 
applies.” Id. at 1523. He suggests that the public dedication doctrine “incorporates a rule-like 
understanding, which encourages judicial enforcement and facilitates bargaining among affected 
interests”––both of which advantage the public dedication doctrine over the public trust doctrine. Id. 
Merrill observes that the public trust doctrine “tends to reflect a poorly defined standard, which confers 
considerable discretion on courts and tends to make bargaining among interest groups more difficult.” 
Id. at 1524. He also remarks that enforcement of the public dedication doctrine may happen more easily 
because “[p]art of the value of the public dedication is capitalized in the value of [abutting landowners’] 
real estate holdings, and this gives [them] a powerful incentive to seek to preserve the dedication.” Id. 
The same is not true of the public trust doctrine’s enforcement where: 
Limiting enforcement to public officials may lead to underenforcement, particularly if 
public officials are vulnerable to capture by private interests that favor development. 
Expanding enforcement by recognizing universal taxpayer standing may result in 
overenforcement, insofar as the preferences of advocacy groups may not align with 
median voter preferences.  
Id.  
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relationships that is neither limited to, nor usefully defined by, the property 
boundaries with which the legal system is accustomed to dealing.”85 This is 
because property is a social construct and not a natural right.86 Since “a man’s 
right [to] his real property . . . is not absolute, [it is] a maxim of the common 
law that one should . . . use his property” in a way that does not “injure the 
rights of others.”87 According to Morris Cohen: 
[W]e can no longer maintain Montesquieu’s view that private property is 
sacrosanct and that the general government must in no way interfere with 
or retrench its domain . . . . To be really effective . . . , the right of property 
must be supported by restrictions or positive duties on the part of owners, 
enforced by the state as much as the right to exclude others which is the 
essence of property . . . [.] [I]f the large property owner is viewed, as he 
ought to be, as a wielder of power over the lives of his fellow citizens, the 
law should not hesitate to develop a doctrine as to his positive duties in the 
public interest.88 
This view of property, a concept constructed by society that should not be used 
in a way that harms others, also infuses the public trust doctrine89 and every 
expansion of it.90 
Prior to the advent of modern environmental legislation, Professor Sax 
suggested that the doctrine could be used to address a variety of environmental 
harms, including many that are now addressed by modern environmental 
 
 85.  Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1971); 
see also Shelby D. Green, No Entry to the Public Lands: Towards a Theory of a Public Trust Servitude 
for a Way Over Abutting Private Land, 14 WYO. L. REV. 19, 58 (2014) (“[Property] has evolved into a 
law of accommodation—evolving with societal needs and efficiency.”). But see George P. Smith II & 
Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations within a Penumbra, 33 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 342 (2006) (“Expansion of the public trust doctrine for no other reason 
than to protect the environment simply ignores the economic precedent established by the original 
doctrine itself.”). Even Professor George P. Smith II and Michael Sweeney, who are clearly not fans of 
the public trust doctrine, nonetheless believe that “[t]he doctrine must be seen as representing and giving 
legal force to innumerable ‘unmarketized present and future social values’ that are oftentimes ignored or 
overlooked in daily life––values that shape the total life experience.” Id. at 341 (citing ZYGMUNT J. B. 
PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 102 (3d ed. 2004)). 
Professor Wood goes further, suggesting that her concept of “Nature’s Trust” invites a complete 
reconceptualization of the doctrine. See Wood, You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra note 10, at 
202–03 (“Courts have repeatedly invited expansion of the doctrine by emphasizing its flexibility to 
accommodate emerging societal needs. Nature’s Trust invites a re-conceptualization of the public trust 
doctrine . . . .”). 
 86.  Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (stating that property “is 
not a natural right, but a deliberate construction by society”). 
 87.  New Jersey v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 1971). The Shack court went on to say that the 
fact that property rights are not absolute leads to “the inevitable proposition that rights are relative and 
[that] there must be an accommodation when they meet.” Id.  
 88.  Green, supra note 85, at 60 (quoting Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL 
L.Q. 8, 21, 26 (1928)). 
 89.  See supra Part II. 
 90.  Professor Carol Rose suggests that the possibility of “hold outs” explains the characterization 
of some property as “inherently public” and thus entitled to protection. See generally Carol Rose, The 
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 
750 (1986).  
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laws.91 Responding to Professor Sax’s call to arms,92 the modern public trust 
doctrine has expanded to protect new trust resources93 and nontraditional 
public uses of those resources despite having to steer around multiple 
environmental laws at all levels of government.94 Araiza finds these instances 
 
 91.  See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 556–57 (“[I]t 
seems that the delicate mixture of procedural and substantive protections which the courts have applied 
in conventional public trust cases would be equally applicable and equally appropriate in controversies 
involving air pollution, the dissemination of pesticides, the location of rights of way for utilities, and 
strip mining or wetland filling on private lands in a state where governmental permits are required.”); 
see also Byrne, supra note 44, at 918 (“Sax saw the public trust doctrine primarily as a device whereby 
courts could correct the tendency of parochial administrative agencies and legislatures to respond to 
well-organized minorities and slight the public interest in natural resource protection.”). Sax also 
thought it was not beyond possibility that the doctrine might be applied to the poor and consumer groups 
who are also “often particularly dramatic examples of diffuse public interests and contain all their 
problems of equality in the political and administrative process.” Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 557. He goes on to say that “[o]nly time will reveal the 
appropriate limits of the public trust doctrine as a useful judicial instrument.” Id.  
 92.  See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 82, at 480 (“Scholars and practitioners have responded to Sax’s 
call and have advocated extending public trust protection to wildlife, parks, cemeteries, and even works 
of fine art.”); Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and Principles of Natural 
Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 285 
(2004) (proposing the application of the public trust doctrine to the electromagnetic spectrum to improve 
public access and perhaps return some of the spectrum that has been allocated to special interests back to 
the public). But see id. at 315–16 (noting differences between the electromagnetic spectrum and natural 
resources law) (“Electromagnetic spectrum is finite in scope and limited by geographic range (a signal 
can only transmit so far), yet when a particular frequency is not used, it remains in its natural state in 
exactly the same condition that it was before and after it was used. In this sense, unlike other natural 
resources, [it] cannot be depleted. . . . [I]ts exploitation does not have negative externalities . . . .”). On 
the other hand, Patrick Ryan remarks that “the electromagnetic spectrum is used to move information 
from one place to another just as intertidal waters are used to move goods, and so ‘navigation’ within the 
spectrum should be a protected public right just as navigation within intertidal waters is protected.” Id. at 
336. He asks “the reader to take faith that the new technologies that have been described in [the article] 
will allow the public to gain access to electromagnetic spectrum as modern technological fishers, 
fowlers, and navigators of this natural resource.” Id. at 335. 
 93.  Some scholars have recommended the expansion of the doctrine to protect entire ecosystems. 
See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269, 1289–90 (1993) 
(arguing for expanding the settings in which the legal concept of public trust could be applied); Alison 
Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a 
Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 393, 410–18 (1991) (explaining various theoretical bases for 
expanding the doctrine to protect naturally functioning ecosystems). 
 94.  See Babcock, supra note 43, at 889–98 & n.180 (summarizing salient aspects of the public 
trust doctrine); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (holding that state title to 
lands under navigable waters is “held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from 
the obstruction or interference of private parties”); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (Minn. 
1893) (making Minnesota the first state to recognize public recreation rights as within the scope of the 
public trust doctrine); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 
1972) (applying the public trust doctrine to recreational use) (“We have no difficulty in finding that, in 
this latter half of the twentieth century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient 
prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend . . . to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming 
and other shore activities. The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be 
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs of 
the public it was created to benefit.”); Harry R. Bader, Antaeus and the Public Trust Doctrine: A New 
Approach to Substantive Environmental Protection in the Common Law, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
749, 761 (1992) (“The marriage of absolute ecological protection with absolute access for the purpose of 
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of doctrinal creep sensible because these interests “are . . . grounded in the 
historical version of the public trust doctrine . . . refer[ring] back to a similar 
(though not identical) set of resources––natural resources.”95 
Once the doctrine expanded to protect ecological systems, the importance 
of navigation as a protected trust use became significantly less important, 
leaving proponents free to identify other uses of trust property entitled to 
protection.96 To Professor Wood, the historic view of the doctrine’s scope, 
which limits it to streambeds and water-related areas, is “superficial and at odds 
with the overriding truth of nature that all ecological resources are 
interconnected and interdependent.”97 To her, “[t]he essential doctrinal 
purposes underlying the public trust doctrine would extend government’s 
fiduciary duty of protection in a holistic manner to all natural assets, including 
air, atmosphere, forests, wildlife, wetlands, aquifers, and soils.”98 Accordingly, 
several scholars––Professor Wood the most prominent among them––have 
even proposed to extend the doctrine to the atmosphere. Professor Peter Byrne 
finds this expansion supportable by “normal legal reasoning,” and believes the 
lack of precedent on the matter is indicative of only the absence of a need until 
now to determine who owns the atmosphere.99 Professor Wood, who has put 
 
utilizing natural resources comes the closest to the true essence of the public trust doctrine.”); Rose, 
supra note 90, at 723 (“[There may be] other practices that share with commerce the power to enhance 
our sociability. We might even think that properties devoted to such noncommercial uses as recreation 
or speech could achieve their highest value when they are accessible to the public at large.”); Wood, 
Protecting the Wildlife Trust, supra note 43, at 611 (explaining the expansion of the doctrine’s 
geographic coverage and the scope of protected trust-based activities). See generally Babcock, supra 
note 8, at 36–54 (discussing the doctrine’s evolution in this country).  
 95.  See Araiza, supra note 66, at 715–16. Professor Rose argued that the socializing function of 
inherently public property might be extended to protect speech taking place in certain locations, citing 
Justice William Brennan’s dissent in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 
2118, 2136–37 (1984), where  
[He] suggested in dissent that certain publicly owned properties—here, utility poles—are 
uniquely suitable for the dissemination of political speech, and should be held open to 
the ‘time-honored’ practice of posting signs. This could be stated as a public trust 
concept: this property is needed for the public’s political communication, thus 
governments hold the property in ‘trust’ for this communication, and have only limited 
abilities to divest the public of its trust rights. 
See Rose, supra note 90, at 778. 
 96.  Byrne, supra note 44, at 925 (“Once the public trust extended to the protection of ecological 
interests, the relation to navigability became vestigial.”); see also Ryan, supra note 82, at 480 (“Scholars 
and practitioners have responded to Sax’s call and have advocated extending public trust protection to 
wildlife, parks, cemeteries, and even works of fine art.”). See generally Mary Christina Wood, 
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future 
Generations (Part 1): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43 (2009) 
(calling for an expansion of the public trust doctrine that would include protecting natural resources 
against threats of climate change and ecological collapse). 
 97.  Wood, You Can’t Negotiate with a Beetle, supra note 10, at 205. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Byrne, supra note 44, at 925–26 (“[N]ormal legal reasoning supports claims that the 
atmosphere lies within the public trust; the absence of precedent on this point is a testament to the prior 
lack of need to specify the nature of ownership of atmosphere.”); see also Save Ourselves, Inc. v. 
Louisiana, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1154 (La. 1984) (recognizing that the public trust doctrine potentially 
protects all natural resources, including air); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 93 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) 
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forth “a theory of a planetary public trust in the atmosphere,”100 has promoted 
this theory in a series of lawsuits around the country.101 These lawsuits, to date, 
have been largely unsuccessful.102 Her theory has also drawn the criticism of 
scholars like Professor Byrne. Despite his sympathy with the reasoning behind 
the leap, Professor Byrne criticizes the initiative because it “exposes the public 
trust doctrine’s greatest weakness: it simply claims too much.”103 The same 
concern, of course, is also raised by the argument in this Article. 
The doctrine has now firmly taken one modern leap in is its application to 
dry land. For example, in Lawrence v. Clark County, the Nevada Supreme 
Court formally embraced the public trust doctrine as fully applicable to existing 
and former riverbeds in that jurisdiction.104 The New Jersey Supreme Court 
held in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n that the doctrine “protects 
the public’s right of access to the seashore, and that this right of access extends 
across dry sand areas located between the water and the nearest public road.”105 
In effect, declared the court, “members of the public have a public trust-based 
 
(citing the public trust doctrine and Pennsylvania Constitution as sources of a mandate to preserve 
“clean air . . . and [] the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the 
environment”); Frank, supra note 44, at 679 (“In many ways, our air resources would seem the natural 
resource most susceptible of treatment as a foundational public trust resource. After all, it is by its 
physical nature incapable of private ‘ownership,’ and science has demonstrated how the private 
degradation of air quality can have demonstrable, harmful impacts on public health and aesthetic 
values.”).  
 100.  Byrne, supra note 44, at 926 (referring to Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust 
Litigation, in CLIMATE CHANGE: A READER 4–6 (W.H. Rodgers, Jr. et al. eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.law.uoregon.edu/faculty/mwood/docs/atmo.pdf); see also Chris Evans, Atmospheric Trust 
Litigation, W. COAST ENVTL. L. (June 14, 2011), available at http://wcel.org/resources/environmental-
law-alert/atmospheric-trust-litigation (discussing 2011 litigation filed by environmental activists against 
all fifty states and the federal government for their failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a 
deficiency plaintiffs claim violates public trust principles).  
 101.  See Legal Action, OUR CHILDREN’S TR., http://ourchildrenstrust.org/Legal (last visited Dec. 
27, 2014) (linking to lawsuits filed across the nation). 
 102.  See, e.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing a claim 
against the Environmental Protection Agency administrator for failing to state a claim and holding that 
the public trust doctrine is a state doctrine that does not raise a federal question), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
774 (2014) (mem.). 
 103.  Byrne, supra note 44, at 927; see also Andrew Childers, General Policy: Appellate Judges 
Reject Appeal from Teens Seeking Federal Action on Greenhouse Gases, ENV’T REP. (BNA) (June 13, 
2014) (reporting that the appellate court had dismissed a suit by California teenagers and two 
environmental groups that sought to compel the federal government to cap greenhouse gas emissions 
after finding that the public trust doctrine does not establish federal question jurisdiction (referring to 
Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, No. 13-5192 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 2014))); Seth Jaffe, Two Strikes 
against Common Law Approaches to Climate Change: The Atmosphere Is Not a Public Trust, L. & 
ENV’T (June 1, 2012), http://www.lawandenvironment.com/2012/06/01/two-strikes-against-common-
law-approaches-to-climate-change-the-atmosphere-is-not-a-public-trust/ (decrying the use of the public 
trust doctrine to compel agencies to protect the atmosphere from climate change by reducing carbon 
dioxide emissions). 
 104.  254 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2011); see also Rose, supra note 41, at 355 (“According to Sax’s 
analysis, the public trust doctrine required the collection of adequate information, public participation in 
decisions, informed and accountable choices, and close scrutiny of private giveaways of environmental 
resources.”). 
 105.  Frank, supra note 44, at 674 (referring to Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 
A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984)). 
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easement right to cross privately-owned, shoreline property to get to the 
ocean.”106 In Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., the 
New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed Matthews, holding that the public trust 
easement is not limited to access across privately owned dry sand areas, but 
also includes the public’s right to sunbathe, picnic, and generally recreate on 
those dry sand areas.107 In In re Water Use Permit Applications, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to groundwater.108 New York 
later applied the doctrine to its state and municipal parks.109 
In these applications of the doctrine, a link to traditional trust resources 
like navigable water or tidelands appears to be fading. Thus, many states have 
now applied the public trust doctrine to parklands.110 
 
 106.  Id.; see also Matthews, 471 A.2d at 323–34 (“Exercise of the public’s right to swim and bathe 
below the mean high water mark may depend upon a right to pass across the upland beach. Without 
some means of access the public right to use the foreshore would be meaningless. To say that the public 
trust doctrine entitles the public to swim in the ocean and to use the foreshore in connection therewith 
without assuring the public of a feasible access route would seriously impinge on, if not effectively 
eliminate, the rights of the public trust doctrine. This does not mean the public has an unrestricted right 
to cross at will over any and all property bordering on the common property. The public interest is 
satisfied so long as there is reasonable access to the sea.”), 365–66 (“Today, recognizing the increasing 
demand for our [s]tate’s beaches and the dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine, we find that the 
public must be given both access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as reasonably necessary. 
While the public’s rights in private beaches are not co-extensive with the rights enjoyed in municipal 
beaches, private landowners may not in all instances prevent the public from exercising its rights under 
the public trust doctrine.”).  
 107.  879 A.2d 112, 119–20 (N.J. 2005). See generally Frank, supra note 44 (discussing these and 
other modern public trust cases). 
 108.  9 P.3d 409, 445–47 (Haw. 2000).  
 109.  Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 554 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270–71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); see also 
Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920) (Pound, J.) (“It need not, and should not, be a mere 
field or open space, but no objects, however worthy, such as courthouses and schoolhouses, which have 
no connection with park purposes, should be permitted to encroach upon it without legislative authority 
plainly conferred . . . .”); Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234, 234 (1871) (applying the 
public trust doctrine to prevent Brooklyn from transferring land that it had taken title to without approval 
of the state legislature). 
 110.  See, e.g., Save the Welwood Murray Mem’l Library Comm. v. City Council, 263 Cal. Rptr. 
896 (Ct. App. 1989) (invoking the public trust doctrine to block conversion of a public library to 
improve public access to nearby commercial areas); Big Sur Props. v. Mott, 132 Cal. Rptr. 835, 837–38 
(Ct. App. 1976) (revoking a permit to cross public parkland to access private property); Paepcke v. Pub. 
Bldg. Comm’n of Chi., 263 N.E.2d 11, 19 (Ill. 1970) (allowing the conveyance of 2 percent of 
Washington Park for a middle school and recreational facilities only after the Chicago Public School 
District showed that the public rights in the remaining parkland were protected and used for a public 
purpose); Gallatin, 128 N.E. at 121 (invalidating a ten-year lease of part of Central Park for a museum 
for impermissibly diverting park resources without the state legislature’s approval); Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 
at 243 (disallowing a sale of parkland due to the city’s trust obligations); Ellington Constr. v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals, 549 N.Y.S.2d 405, 414 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (prohibiting the reconveyance of parkland for 
redevelopment); Ackerman v. Steisel, 480 N.Y.S.2d 556, 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (ordering removal 
of city sanitation equipment from a park); Hoffman v. City of Pittsburgh, 75 A.2d 649 (Pa. 1950) 
(upholding an injunction against the sale of a public square for development based on public trust 
doctrine); In re Conveyance of 1.2 Acres of Bangor Mem’l Park to Bangor Area Sch. Dist., 567 A.2d 
750 (Pa. Commw. Ct 1989) (blocking an attempted transfer of parklands for the construction of an 
elementary school). 
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[Parklands] have the same public values as lands touched by the sea. . . . 
Public land serves as a natural habitat for many species of wildlife and 
vegetation; the rivers and streams flowing through public land have served 
as places for recreation, apart from their service of commerce and 
communication.111 
But, some scholars think that applying the doctrine to nonnavigable water is a 
major, and, therefore, highly questionable enlargement of the doctrine’s 
scope.112 Thus, the doctrine’s expansion to dry land has not proceeded without 
criticism.113 
Another doctrinal leap has expanded the protection of traditional uses of 
trust resources, like navigation, commerce, and fishing to include a similar 
protection of passive uses, like bird watching or gathering scientific 
information.114 While the doctrine’s traditional uses do not easily extrapolate to 
non-water-based resources, the recreational and conservation uses protected by 
the modern doctrine certainly do.115 
Extending a historically water-based doctrine to dry land has led to 
questions about the legal foundation for such expansions, their democratic 
legitimacy, and whether courts are competent to manage the broader 
doctrine.116 Araiza sees this situation “as the ‘paradox’ of the public trust 
 
 111.  Green, supra note 85, at 59; see also Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource 
Law, supra note 33, at 556 (“Traditional public trust law also embraces parklands, especially if they 
have been donated to the public for specific purposes; and, as a minimum, it operates to require that such 
lands not be used for nonpark purposes.”). But see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource 
Law, supra note 33, at 556 (“[I]t is uncommon to find decisions that constrain public authorities in the 
specific uses to which they may put parklands, unless the lands are reallocated to a very different use, 
such as a highway.”). 
 112.  Araiza, supra note 66, at 724–25 (“[B]ringing the doctrine onto dry land is still seen by some 
as a major expansion in its scope, as would embrac[ing] uses grounded in conservation rather than 
access.”).  
 113.  See, e.g., id. at 737–38 (“However, as critics note, it is also true that the doctrine’s expansion 
into dry-land resources raises analytical and practical problems. Precedent, which until recently focused 
on aquatic resources, does not directly support this expansion. It also presents the potential for 
exceptionally broad applications of the doctrine’s legal rule restricting government alienation. In 
addition to raising legitimacy concerns, such an expansion may also test the competence of courts as 
they are asked to decide complex land use and ecosystem-management questions, and evaluate the real 
costs and benefits associated with conflicting resource uses.”). But see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in 
Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 552 (finding courts perfectly able to distinguish between 
appropriate and inappropriate “dealings with trust lands”). 
 114.  Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding that the public trust doctrine 
protects environmental and ecological values). 
 115.  Araiza, supra note 66, at 718 (stating that while traditional doctrine uses “do not easily find 
obvious analogues in dry-land resources, the recreational and conservation uses that the doctrine protects 
surely do”); see also Raritan Baykeeper v. City of New York, 984 N.Y.S.2d 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) 
(holding that the use of a municipal park for solid waste processing (leaf composting) did not meet the 
aesthetic, enjoyable appearance associated with recreation, and finding that the alienation of the park for 
this purpose violated the public trust doctrine). The Raritan Baykeeper court also found that leaf 
composting is a “disruptive, commercial enterprise” that could only be authorized by the legislature. 984 
N.Y.S.2d 634. 
 116.  Araiza, supra note 66, at 711 (questioning the doctrine’s “precise legal foundation, its 
democratic legitimacy, and judicial competence to implement it”); see also Babcock, supra note 43, at 
891 (noting that this application of the doctrine is “even more controversial than the doctrine itself”).  
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doctrine: a deeply felt principle established in venerable law, but at the same 
time, an incompletely worked-out legal doctrine that, in its more aggressive 
forms, threatens to provide courts with wide-ranging authority poorly cabined 
by legal rules.”117 Even Professor Sax conceded that the doctrine’s legal 
provenance was “dubious,”118 creating a shaky platform for its expansion. 
Even so, the “public trust doctrine unquestionably exists as a legally 
binding rule and has existed for centuries. Moreover, the traditional doctrine 
responds to concerns about the political vulnerability of diffusely held public 
resources that transfer, with more or less ease, to a wider set of resources and 
uses.”119 Even Professor Araiza agrees that “the modern resource-protecting 
version of the rule is well established in American law.”120 This is despite his 
finding that the link between modern interests in public trust resources and the 
traditional interests the doctrine protects is “doubly attenuated” because not 
only has the doctrine been used to protect dry land resources, but it has also 
been used to protect uses of trust resources regardless of whether there is public 
access to them.121 
Professor Sax worried about pushing the doctrine too far and warned 
lawyers not to exceed a court’s comfort level. He counseled that courts will not 
intervene if the trust beneficiaries are “press[ing] for direct confrontation 
between the court and the legislature.”122 To Professor Sax: 
 
 117.  Araiza, supra note 66, at 738; see also Smith & Sweeney, supra note 85, at 307 (arguing that 
modern expansions of the public trust doctrine “should be limited within the ancient values of principle 
economic reasoning”), 341 (“In American constitutional law, the public trust doctrine emerged from the 
idea that commercially protected interests enjoyed the right to free navigation on the watercourses. 
While the original doctrine was somewhat simplistic, it was rooted in ancient values and inherited from 
a line of principled economic reasoning.”). Smith and Sweeney find natural law a useful restraint on 
extreme applications of the doctrine. Smith & Sweeney, supra note 85, at 309 (“Although the tenets of 
the Natural Law are penumbric, they nonetheless provide a foundational bearing—or direction—for 
legitimizing the application of the public trust doctrine and, as the case may be, restraining its 
application.”). 
 118.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 484 (“Other than 
the rather dubious notion that the general public should be viewed as a property holder, there is no well-
conceived doctrinal basis that supports a theory under which some interests are entitled to special 
judicial attention and protection.”); see also Rose, supra note 90, at 722 (“Despite its popularity, the 
modern public trust doctrine is notoriously vague as to its own subject matter; cases and academic 
commentaries normally fall back on the generality that the content of the public trust is ‘flexible’ in 
response to ‘changing public needs.’”). But see Smith & Sweeney, supra note 85, at 313 (“Although the 
Supreme Court has never expressly stated so, the concept of the public trust and the resulting affirmative 
duties seem to emanate from the Constitution. While other interpretations of the public trust source 
exist, this is the most reasonable explanation considering the ‘heavy overlay of constitutional doctrine’ 
concerning watercourse regulation.”). 
 119.  Araiza, supra note 66, at 724. 
 120.  Id. at 725. 
 121.  Id. at 716 (stating that “the class of protected resources is expanded to dry-land resources” 
and that the public trust use is expanded from public access to “preservation, with or without public 
access”). 
 122.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 544; see also Sax, 
Liberating the Public Trust from Its Historical Shackles, supra note 48, at 194 (“[S]harp confrontations 
between courts and legislatures should be avoided wherever possible. The courts can do much to 
provoke a search for less disruptive alternatives below the constitutional level. They can assure that 
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A litigation theory which begins with a sophisticated analysis of public 
trust principles—setting out alternatives for the achievement of a 
reasonable development of trust lands with minimal infringement of public 
use—is likely to obtain a far more sympathetic response from the bench 
than is one which takes a rigorous legal principle and squeezes it to 
death.123 
The last Part of this Article attempts to persuade the reader that applying 
the public trust doctrine to protect scenic vistas of Palisades Interstate Park is 
neither “squeezing the doctrine to death” nor asking a court to do “the 
impossible.”124 
IV. EXTENSION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO PROTECTING 
SCENIC VIEWS OF PALISADES INTERSTATE PARK IS JUSTIFIABLE 
According to Professor Sax, there are three bases for expanding the 
doctrine. First, “certain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen 
that their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather 
than of serfs.”125 Second, “certain interests are so particularly the gifts of 
nature’s bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the 
populace.”126 And third, “certain uses have a peculiarly public nature that 
makes their adaptation to private use inappropriate.”127 This Part of the Article 
posits that seeing beautiful natural scenery is of great intrinsic importance to 
the public, and that wild places, especially those in close proximity to urban 
areas like Palisades Interstate Park, are such unique gifts of nature’s bounty that 
 
decisions made by mere administrative agencies are not allowed to impair trust interests in the absence 
of explicit, fully considered legislative judgments. . . . Finally, the courts can reduce the pressures that 
claims of private ownership put on public trust resources by looking to the history of common rights.”). 
 123.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 553. 
 124.  Id. at 566 (“If lawyers and their clients are willing to ask for less than the impossible, the 
judiciary can be expected to play an increasingly important and fruitful role in safeguarding the public 
trust.”). This Article does not address whether LG Electronics could have brought a successful takings 
claim against the Englewood Cliffs’ zoning commission had it denied the variance. It seems likely that 
such a claim would fail because of the reciprocity of advantage that all landowners would enjoy from 
the height restrictions given the economic value of scenic views. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace and the 
Takings Clause, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 421, 423 (2012). Courts frequently recognize landowners’ air 
rights in the form of view and solar easements. Id. at 423, 429. However, the reciprocity of advantage 
defense, where one argues that the government’s action actually promotes general welfare or sufficiently 
benefits other landowners, as would be the case here where all neighboring parcels benefit in common 
from open air space, would appear to defeat the claim. Id. at 448–49 (“This ‘reciprocity of advantage’ 
among landowners is a familiar characteristic of the sorts of legitimate police power regulations that 
tend not to trigger compensable takings. Regulatory takings laws seek not to hinder valuable police 
power regulation but to target those restrictions by which ‘private property is being pressed into some 
form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.’”).  
 125.  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 33, at 484. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 485; see also Ryan, supra note 92, at 246–47. Like the electromagnetic spectrum, 
Palisades Interstate Park is “finite, geographically bound, and subject to exploitation and enjoyment by a 
mixture of public, private, and governmental uses. And like many of the world’s largest natural 
resources, [it] provides its greatest value to the public not by being improved, but by being left alone.” 
See Ryan, supra note 92, at 360–61. 
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the interest in maintaining them as they are is so “peculiarly public” that their 
appropriation for private use, in this case as the foreground for a commercial 
building, is inappropriate. 
Even where Professor Sax’s three bases for expanding the doctrine are 
met, the existence of some “conceptual bridge” between traditional uses of the 
doctrine and a proposed new use would further strengthen the argument that the 
public trust doctrine should apply in a novel situation like the one proposed 
here.128 In the case of scenic views of a public park, this Article suggests that a 
conceptual linkage can be found in the doctrine’s socializing benefits, which 
flow from individuals viewing an aesthetically pleasing site, like an unspoiled 
landscape. A conceptual link can also be found in the prohibition against 
alienating trust resources and the necessity of having unencumbered visual 
access to trust resources to be able to enjoy them.129 Both of these rationales 
are developed further below. 
A. Viewing Palisades Interstate Park Is a Protected Use Because It Enhances 
the Park’s Social Value 
[T]he simple perception of natural forms is a delight . . . . The tradesman, 
the attorney comes out of the din and craft of the street, and sees the sky 
and the woods, and is a man again.130 
Protection of aesthetic values has been integrated into the concept of 
public welfare131 and has been accepted as a legitimate use of local police 
 
 128.  See Ryan, supra note 92, at 360. 
 129.  Rose argues:  
An entire populace may have customs as well, as Blackstone and others recognized when 
they called the common law the ‘custom of the country.’ The concept of a managed but 
completely open commons presupposes just such a populace—one that behaves 
according to customs of civic care, and with some regard for the resources it uses. Such a 
concept of the citizenry, after all, was familiar to nineteenth-century jurisprudence, given 
the serious discussion during the American revolutionary and constitutional periods of 
‘republican virtue’—the individual self-restraint and civic regard for the greater good 
that was thought essential to any democratic regime.  
Rose, supra note 90, at 746. Because of the requirement that “custom” be an activity that existed before 
the memory of man, this Article does not posit that the public has a customary right to view Palisades 
Interstate Park. But, the idea that an undifferentiated public, as opposed to specific individuals, can lay 
claim to inherently public property is a useful one in the public trust context, as Rose explains in the 
context of public roads and waterways. Id. 
 130.  Emerson, supra note 1, at 13. 
 131.  See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (Douglas, J.) (“The concept of the public 
welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well 
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be 
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”); 
see also Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 611–12 (2d Cir. 1965) 
(“[The project] is to be located in an area of unique beauty and major historical significance. . . . 
‘Recreational purposes’ are expressly included among the beneficial public uses to which [the Federal 
Power Act] refers. The phrase undoubtedly encompasses the conservation of natural resources, the 
maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation of historic sites.”) (holding that the Federal Power 
Commission construed its mandate too narrowly when it authorized the construction of a pump storage 
project on top of Storm King Mountain). 
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powers by courts around the nation,132 even though judgments about what is 
aesthetically pleasing can be highly subjective.133 Viewing a landscape is “an 
undeniable ‘aesthetic experience’”;134 this conclusion is borne out by the 
literature of landscape aesthetics, which links scenic visual resources with 
having an aesthetic experience.135 
The conviction that an enlightened person should take aesthetic pleasure in 
nature has grown only more pervasive in American society—evidence not 
only that nature has skillful publicists, but that the nature aesthetic is 
serving important social and political functions: marking class status, 
galvanizing political support for environmental causes, and selling 
consumer goods from tulip bulbs to suburban estates. It also suggests that 
the pursuit of natural beauty may represent other, non-aesthetic concerns: 
an emotional connection to the landscape, a spiritual rather than aesthetic 
approach to nature, an intellectual satisfaction with the idea of pristine 
wildness, even sheer sensual delight.136 
Aesthetic experiences, such as viewing scenic landscapes, add richness to 
everyday life at the same time that they offer a detachment from the 
ordinariness of that life.137 An aesthetic experience gives a person intrinsic 
pleasure from merely looking at something of beauty; she need not possess it to 
 
 132.  See Mark Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection under the Police Power, 22 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 697, 701 (1995) (“While the results have varied from state to state, there is a clear trend for 
courts to find aesthetic regulation solely for aesthetic purposes permissible under the general welfare 
prong.”), 718 (“[A]esthetic goals have been accepted in a majority of jurisdictions as a legitimate 
exercise of the police power, even when standing alone.”); Beverly A. Rowlett, Aesthetic Regulation 
under the Police Power: The New General Welfare and the Presumption of Constitutionality, 34 VAND. 
L. REV. 603, 608 (1981) (“[M]ore recent interpretations of the general welfare provide new 
‘nonaesthetic’ justifications, the traditional rule that aesthetics alone is not a proper basis for regulation 
now has virtually no discernible effect on the outcome of the aesthetic regulation cases.”); Norman 
Williams, Scenic Protection as a Legitimate Goal of Public Regulation, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 3, 4 (1990) (stating that scenic protection is a legitimate public goal). 
 133.  Rowlett, supra note 132, at 606. But see Douglas E. Fisher, Can Law Protect Landscape 
Values?, 9 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 48 (2005) (“A value, particularly a value such as landscape, tends to lack 
the precision and certainty required for rules of law. It is therefore not a surprise that the legal system 
has difficulty in addressing issues of landscape values.”); Williams, supra note 132, at 4 (“[T]he courts 
have been willing to uphold the application of restrictions based on aesthetic criteria without worrying 
about how to deal with the more difficult problems at the margin, where reasonable people may 
reasonably differ.”).  
 134.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 722. But see Richard E. Chenoweth & Paul H. Gobster, The 
Nature and Ecology of Aesthetic Experiences in the Landscape, 9 LANDSCAPE J. 1, 2 (1990) (stating that 
much of the literature on aesthetics concerns art, which may not “translate well to landscapes” because 
“unlike the experience of art, landscapes are dynamic, people are in the landscape, and the mere turning 
of one’s head may change the experience radically”). 
 135.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 724. 
 136.  Kimberly K. Smith, Mere Taste: Democracy and the Politics of Beauty, 7 WIS. ENVTL. L.J. 
151, 158 (2000). 
 137.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 722–23 (“[Aesthetic experiences offer] a richness otherwise 
not present in the experience of ordinary life events, a unity within itself, and a detachment from the 
normal flow of events.”); see also Chenoweth & Gobster, supra note 134, at 2 (“[A]esthetic experiences 
have a completeness and coherence, a unity that makes them stand out from the experiences and flow of 
everyday life.”).  
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feel that pleasure.138 Taking time to view something pleasing offers 
opportunities for leisure and recreation as well as an opportunity to reduce 
stress.139 Enjoying something that is naturally beautiful can also be defended 
on utilitarian grounds––quite simply, “natural beauty delights us. To preserve it 
makes everyone happier.”140 The intrinsic satisfaction of having an aesthetic 
experience, such as viewing a beautiful thing, makes that experience 
priceless.141 
Natural beauty has consistently played a role in environmental politics and 
since the latter half of the nineteenth century, Americans have supported beauty 
as a freestanding policy goal.142 Early policy debates over the preservation of 
trust resources such as the national parks, scenic rivers, and coastlines reveal 
that preserving natural beauty was a dominant concern, beyond just protecting 
natural resources, wildlife, and the integrity of ecosystems.143 Thus, President 
Lyndon Johnson echoed a long line of policy makers when he cited the 
preservation of beauty as the primary goal of the National Wilderness 
Preservation System: “‘In this conservation,’ he insisted, ‘the protection and 
enhancement of man’s opportunity to be in contact with beauty must play a 
major role. This means that beauty must not be just a holiday treat, but a part of 
our daily life.’”144 
Not surprisingly, protecting visual resources of aesthetic value has been an 
acknowledged goal of environmental management for at least a generation.145 
“The protected visual resource may be a ‘viewshed’—a vista featuring 
mountains and hillsides, riverbanks and watercourses, villages and farms, or 
 
 138.  See Chenoweth & Gobster, supra note 134, at 2 (“Merely looking at something without 
needing to possess or consume it because of its potential usefulness ‘gives us the special experience that 
we derive from objects that please us merely upon being seen.’”); see also Emerson, supra note 1, at 12 
(“The ancient Greeks called the world [kosmos], beauty. Such is the constitution of all things, or such 
the plastic power of the human eye, that the primary forms, as the sky, the mountain, the tree, the 
animal, give us a delight in and for themselves; a pleasure arising from outline, color, motion, and 
grouping.”). 
 139.  Smith, supra note 136, at 165. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 722. 
 142.  Smith, supra note 136, at 155. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 156; see also Emily Brady, Aesthetics in Practice: Valuing the Natural World, 15 
ENVTL. VALUES 277, 277 (2006) (“I have titled this paper ‘Aesthetics in Practice’ to convey how deeply 
aesthetic value permeates human practice, from engagement with everyday environments, to enjoying 
wild places, to making moral choices, to scientific study of nature. The aesthetic is not reserved for the 
art museum, concert hall or scenic view-point. While a distinctive kind of valuing, it is not separate or 
cut off but rather integrated into the relationships we develop with the natural world through a variety of 
human activities.”). 
 145.  See Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 697; see also Fisher, supra note 133, at 47 (“International 
law, for example, has begun to move quite rapidly towards the recognition and protection of landscape. 
However, it has done so indirectly for the most part by recognizing the relevance of landscape values in 
the context of environmental conservation on the one hand and the recognition of human rights on the 
other hand.”). 
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other areas of natural or cultural beauty.”146 According to Professor Mark 
Bobrowski, the New England states all agree that the protection of scenic views 
is publicly beneficial.147 Additionally, the National Environmental Policy Act 
and its state offspring assume that visual resources, like scenic vistas, offer the 
public a highly valued opportunity for aesthetic experiences.148 The National 
Environmental Policy Act recognizes the importance of aesthetics as a purpose 
behind the law’s enactment,149 and other laws like the National Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act, the National Trials Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, 
and even the Endangered Species Act150 and several state constitutions 
consider the protection of scenic and aesthetic environmental values as a matter 
of great public importance.151 Courts have also recognized the importance of 
 
 146.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 698, 702 (“The range of approaches employed in these 
ordinances and regulations reflect the history of the debate over aesthetic purposes: landscape protection 
has evolved from a secondary purpose, barely countenanced under the police power, to a consistent 
theme in environmental protection.”). Sometimes protecting a scenic view complements an effort to 
protect an important natural resource like a wetland or a forest, but regardless, the views of that resource 
enhance the attractiveness of the area. Id. at 713 (“Farmlands are important to the local economy . . . . 
The value of farmlands, however, goes beyond economic considerations. Farmlands play an important 
role in the protection of fragile natural environments such as wetlands and streams, and contribute to 
certain wildlife habitat needs. In addition, farmlands function as a valuable scenic and open space 
resource . . . .” (quoting Kentview Props., Inc. v. City of Kent, 795 P.2d 732, 736 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1990))); see also Chenoweth & Gobster, supra note 134, at 8 (“Our results showed that aesthetic 
experiences tended to occur unexpectedly rather than being sought out by a person, occurred most often 
as a result of interactions with natural objects, and tended to occur in familiar places. Together, these 
findings suggest that opportunities should be provided for people to experience nature in their home 
environments as part of their everyday activities.”). 
 147.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 729; see also Kroeger v. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 870 A.2d 
566 (Me. 2005) (sustaining Maine Department of Environmental Protection’s decision to deny a permit 
for a private dock in part because it would interfere with scenic views of the sound into which it 
protruded and in part because of the area’s importance for tourism); In re Waterfront Dev. Permit No. 
WD88-0443-I, 582 A.2d 1018, 1019 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (remanding New Jersey 
environmental protection commissioner’s decision to issue a permit for the build-out stage of a Lincoln 
Harbor development, reasoning that the development would obscure “spectacular” scenic views of the 
Hudson River and the New York City skyline from New Jersey in violation of regulations prohibiting 
the blocking of skylines and horizons). 
 148.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 698. 
 149.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(2) (2012) (“It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal 
Government to . . . assure for all Americans safe, healthy, productive, and aesthetically and culturally 
pleasing surroundings.”). 
 150.  Smith, supra note 136, at 157 (citing National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1242(a)(2) 
(2012); National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271; Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1451(b), (e), 1452(2); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 
4331(b)(2)).  
 151.  See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public 
natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As 
trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the 
people.”); see also Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 913 (Pa. 2013) (applying 
section 27 to a local town’s refusal to permit a fracking operation); John C. Dernbach et al., Robinson 
Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Examination and Implications 15 (Widener Law Sch. 
Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 14-10, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412657 
(analyzing the implications of the opinion for section 27 and reporting that dozens of state constitutions 
“contain provisions fairly characterized as recognizing that the state holds resources in ‘public trust’”). 
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landscapes to the general welfare. Professor Mark Bobrowski observed that 
judges responding to state laws and local ordinances protecting scenic views 
found that they constituted a valid public purpose.152 
Studies show that the psychologically valuable opportunities for leisure 
and recreation that scenic landscapes offer are important to “our collective 
mental health.”153 Part of the restorative benefit of recreation comes from being 
in natural surroundings.154 Professor Rose reports that Frederick Law Olmsted, 
the nineteenth century designer of major park systems in New York City and 
Washington, D.C., among others, considered recreation in natural settings to 
have a “socializing and educative influence, [which are] particularly helpful for 
democratic values.”155 According to Professor Sax, these influences are 
important attributes of the public trust doctrine.156 Olmsted’s view was that the 
“rich and poor would mingle in parks, and learn to treat each other as 
neighbors. Parks would enhance public mental health, with ultimate benefits to 
sociability; all could revive from the antisocial characteristics of urban life 
under the refining influence of the park’s soothing landscape.”157 Thus, scenic 
landscapes, like parks, “help define valuable aspects of the community.”158 
 
But see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of 
Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 158 (2003) (“State courts also have 
helped ease most of the constitutional provisions [protecting the environment] into relative obscurity by 
holding that the provisions are not self-executing, by denying standing to private citizens and groups 
trying to enforce the provisions, or by establishing relatively easy standards for meeting the 
constitutional requirements.”). 
 152.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 724 (surveying judicial responses to state and local ordinances 
protecting scenic views, and concluding that there was “ample support for the proposition that 
enhancement of the visual resource constitutes a valid public purpose”); see also Tara J. Foster, 
Comment, Securing a Right to View: Broadening the Scope of Negative Easements, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 269 (1989) (discussing the history of easements that protect the viewshed rights of private property 
owners). 
 153.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 723. 
 154.  See id. (“[V]iewing unthreatening natural landscapes tends to promote faster and more 
complete restoration from stress than does viewing unblighted urban or built environments lacking 
nature.”), 745 (“Protection of the visual resource promotes greater opportunities for aesthetic 
experiences such as recreation and leisure. There is an apparent link between such aesthetic experience 
and psychological or philosophical well-being.”); Louis G. Tassinary et al., Equal Protection and 
Aesthetic Zoning: A Possible Crack and a Preemptive Repair, 42 URB. LAW. 375, 390 (2011) (“[M]uch 
of the impetus for research on the restorative benefits of nature has come from actively engaged 
recreationists in scenic settings, self-reporting stress reduction, and other psychological benefits.”). 
 155.  Rose, supra note 90, at 779. 
 156.  See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Sax’s praise for the 
democratization of the decision-making process by the public trust doctrine). 
 157.  Rose, supra note 90, at 779. 
 158.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 703. Scenic easements are conservation easements that have 
the goal of protecting views of the physical environment deemed of public value, while burdening 
private property. See Scenic Easements & View Protection, SCENIC AM., http://www.scenic.org/ 
issues/scenic-easements-a-view-protection (last visited Jan. 31, 2015). The authorizing law of the state 
in which a scenic or conservation easement is created determines their scope and what they are called. 
Id. The Federal Uniform Conservation Easement Act “expressly allows conservation easements that 
retain or protect natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property.” Id. “As of 2000, the laws of at 
least [twenty-four] states expressly allowed conservation easements that protected scenic values, with 
many more allowing them as part of common law practice.” Id. Scenic easements favor protecting an 
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Olmsted believed that nature was important for character transformation and 
that it was important to create civic places where all “people, regardless of 
socioeconomic standing, should sense that they belong to a community.”159 
The landscape is more than a passive backdrop. It is the stage on which we 
move. The events of life take place somewhere and that “whereness” 
affects the perception of the event. The visual landscape, the environment 
we see, gives shape to our character. The objects and forms in that 
landscape influence our actions, guide our choices, affect our values, 
restrict or enhance our freedom, determine where and with what quality we 
will mix with each other. The perceived landscape molds our dreams, 
locates our fantasies and in some mysterious way even predicts our 
future.160 
According to Professor Rose, “contemplation of nature elevates our minds 
above the workaday world, and thus helps us to cope with that very world.”161 
Others maintain that “[n]atural beauty is arguably a unique good, conferring 
health benefits not realizable in other ways; there are few obvious substitutes 
for sunlight on still water or a snow-covered forest.”162 Perhaps this is why 
most Americans prefer the natural environment to an urbanized one.163 
Thus, one way to justify protecting beautiful landscapes is to realize that 
“beauty . . . is essential to our mental, physical, and spiritual health––a basic 
need, if only we were enlightened enough to see it.”164 Getting to this point of 
 
offsite visual feature of economic importance to the burdened property. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 
132, at 4 (“[W]ith the widespread increase in both income and leisure time, many more people are able 
to––and have the opportunity to––indulge their preferences for a visually attractive environment, and 
public bodies have been responding with protective measures.”) (explaining why protecting scenic vistas 
has become a legitimate public policy goal). 
 159.  Scott Roulier, Frederick Law Olmsted Democracy by Design, 4 NEW ENG. J. POL. SCI. 311, 
313 (2010).  
 160.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 719 (quoting Alan Gussow, Conserving the Magnitude of 
Uselessness: A Philosophical Perspective, in OUR NATIONAL LANDSCAPE: A CONFERENCE ON APPLIED 
TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT OF THE VISUAL RESOURCE 10 (Apr. 23–25, 1979), 
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/documents/psw_gtr035/psw_gtr035_FC-35.pdf); see 
also Roulier, supra note 159, at 313–14 (“[I]t is hard to deny that Olmsted’s tireless efforts to preserve 
national treasures for posterity and to create beautiful and accessible public parks has enriched our 
democratic landscape—a landscape constantly threatened by excessive privatization and social 
isolation.”). 
 161.  Rose, supra note 90, at 780. 
 162.  Smith, supra note 136, at 165; see also FREDERICK LAW OLMSTED, YOSEMITE AND THE 
MARIPOSA GROVE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1865), available at http://www.yosemite.ca.us/library/ 
olmsted/report.html (“It is a scientific fact that the occasional contemplation of natural scenes of an 
impressive character, particularly if this contemplation occurs in connection with relief from ordinary 
cares, change of air and change of habits, is favorable to the health and vigor of men and especially to 
the health and vigor of their intellect beyond any conditions which can be offered them, that it not only 
gives pleasure for the time being but increases the subsequent capacity for happiness and the means of 
securing happiness.”). Olmsted, supra, also writes that “the enjoyment of scenery employs the mind 
without fatigue and yet exercises it, tranquilizes it and yet enlivens it; and thus, through the influence of 
the mind over the body, gives the effect of refreshing rest and reinvigoration to the whole system.” 
 163.  Tassinary et al., supra note 154, at 386; see also JAY APPLETON, THE EXPERIENCE OF 
LANDSCAPE 389 (1996) (“Further, prospect focal features in environmental scenes are found to elicit eye 
fixations of greater duration than would be expected by chance.”). 
 164.  Smith, supra note 136, at 173. 
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enlightenment, which might enable the preservation of landscapes because of 
their natural beauty, however, may require focused civic education.165 
Professor Bobrowski believes that protecting visual resources like 
landscapes promotes the general welfare because doing so can enhance both 
communal and individual aspirations.166 For this reason, Professor Bobrowski 
concludes that protecting a “landscape is crucial in defining [a] community” 
and “may help us define ourselves as individuals.”167 Additionally, because the 
pleasure one experiences from viewing a beautiful object is largely passive, it 
may trigger in the observer “a sense of humility, unity, and introspection.”168 In 
this way, visual experiences, like viewing a natural vista, can actually mold our 
nature.169 
Visual resources play a crucial role in many parts of daily life.170 
Professor Rose reminds us that the belief that recreating in natural 
environments or viewing nature civilizes and socializes us as a people is well-
established in Western thought.171 According to Emily Brady, some 
environmental philosophers like Aldo Leopold believed that engaging with 
nature aesthetically can encourage a moral attitude toward it.172 Brady 
 
 165.  Tassinary et al., supra note 154, at 393 (“To justify preserving existing landscapes or 
urbanscapes via the codification of aesthetic values requires the premise that beauty is essential to our 
mental, physical, and spiritual health––a basic need, albeit one that may require the education of our 
individual and collective attention.”). 
 166.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 745 (“Protection of the visual resource promotes the general 
welfare by furthering both communitarian and individualistic aims.”), 746 (“The specific protected 
view, in some locally understood way, helps to define the very core of the community. Denver’s 
legislative [body found] . . . that its panoramic mountain views encourage civic pride and embody the 
city’s ‘unique environmental heritage and attributes as a city of the plains at the foot of the Rocky 
Mountains.’”); id. at 746 (“‘[T]he visual landscape, the environment we see . . . gives shape to our 
character,’ as communities and as individuals.”). 
 167.  Id. at 745; see also Smith, supra note 136, at 194 (“[W]hile aesthetic judgment may have 
supported the elitist pretensions of the upper classes, it has also played a role in protecting communal 
values against dangerously ‘wanton’ impulses.”). 
 168.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 722–23; see also Chenoweth & Gobster, supra note 134, at 3 
(reporting that aesthetic experiences can be disorienting in space and time and arouse “a sense of 
humility, unity, and introspection”). Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote that “[n]o reason can be asked or 
given why the soul seeks beauty. Beauty, in its largest and profoundest sense, is one expression for the 
universe.” Emerson, supra note 1, at 17. 
 169.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 723; see also Brady, supra note 144, at 279 (“Rather than 
being private expressions of individual taste, aesthetic judgements [sic] are based upon a set of critical 
activities that are practised [sic] and developed in a public context.”). 
 170.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 720. Indeed, Tassinary and his colleagues urge people to 
“actively seek aesthetic goals through the political arena because we must aspire to ‘a democracy in 
which sensitive aesthetes and expressive and emotional forms of discourse have a secure place . . . [in 
order to avoid] cultural mediocrity, degraded materialism and suffocated human spirits.’” Tassinary et 
al., supra note 154, at 392 (quoting Smith, supra note 136, at 194–95); see also id. at 376 (arguing that 
beauty standing alone serves a public good, placing its preservation firmly within a state’s police 
power); Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 744 (arguing that visual resource protection’s importance “makes 
it a [public] purpose that may stand alone as an exercise of the police power”). 
 171.  Rose, supra note 90, at 781. 
 172.  Brady, supra note 144, at 280 (“Some environmental philosophers [like Leopold] have 
suggested that developing a relationship with nature through aesthetic experiences, that is, first-hand, 
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comments that sometimes, an aesthetic experience is “the most visceral, felt 
experience we can have of nature. In that sense it can be very penetrating, have 
a strong impact and just stay with us.”173 
Many of the individual and community benefits that flow from viewing 
beautiful landscapes are those associated with protecting trust resources like 
parks, according to Professors Sax and Rose. Based on this discussion of the 
importance of having an aesthetic experience to the general welfare and the 
recognition that viewing a landscape is such an experience, a strong argument 
can be made that protecting passive uses of trust resources, such as enjoying 
views of them, fulfills a public purpose and thus is a protectable use of a trust 
resource under the public trust doctrine. 
 
 
B. Spoiling the View of a Trust Resource Is Like Impeding Access to It 
Nature at the doorstep should not be underestimated.174 
Scenic vistas have the classic attributes of a use of a public trust 
resource—res communis—as they are “open to everyone, belonging to 
everyone, and incapable of appropriation by anyone.”175 A scenic vista can be 
appropriated by someone interfering with it.176 Indeed, Professor Rose might 
argue that interfering with the public’s view of the Palisades Interstate Park 
matters “a great deal, not because it would be impossible to conduct these 
activities elsewhere, but because to relocate would rupture the continuity of the 
community’s experience and diminish the significance of the activity itself.”177 
While we may change our view of what activities are “socializing” and thus 
justify calling some property “inherently public,” “we always accept that the 
 
multi-sensory, emotional and imaginative engagement, can encourage or contribute to a moral attitude 
toward nature.”). 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Chenoweth & Gobster, supra note 134, at 8. 
 175.  Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, World Ocean Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries after Grotius––
Towards a New Ocean Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 645, 664 (2004); see also OLMSTED, supra 
note 162 (“For the same reason that the water of rivers should be guarded against private appropriation 
and the use of it for the purpose of navigation and otherwise protected against obstructions, portions of 
natural scenery may therefore be properly guarded and cared for by the government. To simply reserve 
them from monopoly by individuals, however, it will be obvious, is not all that is necessary. It is 
necessary that they should be laid open to the use of the body of the people.”). 
 176.  See, e.g., Friends of Shawangunks v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that an 
amendment to a federally funded, state conservation easement, which would have extended a private 
golf course, impermissibly converted the land to “other than public outdoor recreation use” without 
federal approval under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, and holding that even though the 
public did not have access to the land during the easement, the land served a public outdoor recreation 
use by exposing a scenic vista and acting as a buffer between a state park and developed areas). 
 177.  Rose, supra note 90, at 759–60 (“[L]and ‘dedicated’ to the public could be ‘accepted’ by 
sheer public usage, if that use had continued so long that public ‘accommodation’ would be substantially 
affected by interruption.” (quoting President of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 429, 439 
(1832))). 
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public requires access to some physical locations for some of these 
activities.”178 
A poorly placed “eyesore,” like a billboard or a junkyard, can interfere 
with a scenic view in the same way that a gate blocking access to an otherwise 
public beach appropriates that beach to a private use. Detracting from the 
beauty of the landscape, in this case by allowing the construction of a building 
that mars its visual integrity, diminishes the desire to physically enjoy the 
resource. For this reason, local regulations often protect scenic vistas that are 
accessible from public locations by prohibiting structures like junkyards and 
billboards.179 The restrictions often also apply to the construction of buildings 
when their placement interferes with views of scenic places,180 and courts 
frequently sustain height restrictions to protect scenic views.181 The regulations 
“acknowledge and protect the landscape behind the eyesore”; in other words, 
“it is the eyesore’s interference with the viewshed that justifies government 
regulation.”182 Although the building at issue in this Article is in the 
background, not foreground, of the scenic vista, the interference with the 
viewshed, the scenic vista, is just as pronounced. 
The fact that many members of the public can enjoy scenic views of the 
Park and that those numbers can increase “enhances the value of the [aesthetic] 
 
 178.  Id. at 781 (emphasis added). 
 179.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 708. 
 180.  See, e.g., Belmar Estates v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 171 Cal. Rptr. 773, 774–75 (Ct. App. 
1981) (upholding the California Coastal Commission’s decision to deny permission to construct a 
subdivision in the Santa Monica Mountains, noting, among other problems with the project, that “[s]ince 
the home sites are to be on the top of ridges, the houses will restrict ocean view from other parts of the 
Santa Monica mountains and view of the mountains from significant parts of the ocean and ocean 
frontage”); Dep’t of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 571 P.2d 196, 199–202 (Wash. 1977) (ordering 
removal of two, new proposed buildings that would project into the lake further than existing buildings 
along the shoreline and cut off views of the lake from preexisting houses). The Pacesetter court also 
noted that the project was “inconsistent with the permitted uses which favor preservation of the 
shoreline’s natural character and the ecology of the shoreline.” 571 P.2d at 201. 
 181.  See Williams, supra note 132, at 4 (“[W]ith the widespread increase in both income and 
leisure time, many more people are able to––and have the opportunity to––indulge their preferences for 
a visually attractive environment, and public bodies have been responding with protective measures.”) 
(explaining why protecting scenic vistas have become a legitimate public policy goal), 24 (“[O]n the 
authority of experienced courts in important states, we have it (a) that the height of new buildings may 
be restricted to preserve the vista of a major mountain range, [and] (b) that new development in a 
residential neighborhood may be held up, and modifications may be required, if a proposed development 
would block a neighbor’s existing views . . . .”). 
 182.  Bobrowski, supra note 132, at 729; see also Asselin v. Town of Conway, 628 A.2d 247, 249 
(N.H. 1993). The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that regulated sign 
illumination after finding that it was adopted “solely to promote aesthetic values, including preserving 
scenic vistas, discouraging development from competing with the natural environment, and promoting 
the character of a ‘country community.’” Asselin, 628 A.2d at 249. The court additionally found that 
“[i]t is reasonable to infer that the scenic vistas sought to be preserved by the town include the splendor 
of mountains at twilight and the brilliance of stars at night.” Id. at 372–73. Bobrowski cites the Asselin 
decision as “a clear example of a court upholding an eyesore regulation, supported on aesthetic grounds 
alone, because a specific background view was protected by the local government.” Bobrowski, supra 
note 132, at 731. 
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activity rather than diminishing it.”183 In fact, this lack of exclusivity––its 
“very publicness”––“makes it valuable, because this activity is exponentially 
enhanced by greater participation.”184 According to Professor Rose, “[i]n an 
odd Lockeanism, the public deserve[s] access to these properties, because 
‘publicness,’ nonexclusive open access, create[s] their highest value.”185 In 
order for the public to claim a property right, according to Professor Rose, two 
elements are essential: 
[F]irst, the property ha[s] to be physically capable of monopolization by 
private persons—or would have been without doctrines securing public 
access against such threats. Second, the public’s claim ha[s] to be superior 
to that of the private owner, because the properties themselves [are] most 
valuable when used by indefinite and unlimited numbers of persons—by 
the public at large.186 
In the instant situation, LG Electronics has proposed to monopolize views of 
the Park by constructing a building that will substantially interfere with that 
use. The fact that views of the Park can be enjoyed by an infinite and unlimited 
number of people makes that use of the Park superior to LG’s proposed use. 
Seeing something is a form of access to the thing being seen; if you do not 
have access to it with your eyes, you cannot see and enjoy it. It makes sense to 
accord the public a right to see something they have a right to use.187 Even the 
Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,188 which held 
unconstitutional permit conditions that expropriated a private beach for public 
use, did not disparage the principle that being able to see something affirms 
access to it.189 
Therefore, having access to a trust resource is dependent on being able to 
see it; conversely, enjoying a trust resource with your eyes is dependent on 
 
 183.  Rose, supra note 90, at 768. 
 184.  Id. at 769. 
 185.  Id. at 770. 
 186.  Id. at 774. 
 187.  Michael Neiderbach, Transferrable Public Rights: Reconciling Public Rights and Private 
Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 899, 928 (1989) (“The Court’s opinion should have focused on whether the 
public had a right to view the coast. It makes sense to accord the public this right . . . since the public has 
the right to use the tidelands, it certainly must have the right to see them. . . . [T]he beauty of the 
coastline should be seen, not only heard.” (commenting on the Court’s opinion in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987))). 
 188.  Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838 (rejecting the California Coastal Commission’s allegation that a 
landowner’s proposed construction would block “visual access” to a beach, interfering with the desire of 
people driving past the house to use the beach and creating a “‘psychological barrier’ to ‘access,’” 
finding that the Commission had failed to demonstrate a nexus between the nature of the exaction and a 
legitimate end that would justify total prohibition of the proposed use); Foster, supra note 152, at 295. 
 189.  Neiderbach, supra note 187, at 920 (“Even though the Nollan Court implicitly acknowledged 
the public’s right to view the foreshore in its analysis, the practical effect of the decision was to deny the 
existence of public rights.”); see also id. at 915 (“While the Court was willing to assume, for the sake of 
argument, that preserving the public’s view of the beach and surmounting the psychological barrier to 
using the beach were legitimate state interests, it nevertheless imposed severe nexus requirements on the 
development permit condition. The Court viewed the permit condition as unconstitutional because there 
was a lack of sufficient nexus between the lateral access easement and the legitimate state interest in 
preservation of the coastal view and psychological access.”). 
34 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 42:1 
having access to it. When access to a trust resource is impeded and the 
enjoyment of that resource is thus prevented, the public trust doctrine is 
violated. Although there is no physical barrier preventing the public from 
accessing Palisades Interstate Park, the intrusion of the LG Electronics building 
into the scenic view of the Park will interfere with its visual use; this 
interference is as concrete as if there were a fence across a trail into the Park or 
pollution from a nearby factory shrouding the view. Therefore, restricting the 
public’s ability to enjoy a scenic vista of the Park by constructing a building in 
that view is a violation of the public trust doctrine. 
Scenic views of Palisades Interstate Park have public value and are a use 
of the Park that merits protection under the public trust doctrine. Undisturbed 
landscapes perform many positive societal functions that are typical of trust 
property.190 As Professor Rose might say, the fact that many people can enjoy 
unobstructed views of Palisades Interstate Park is good “for the . . . 
socialization and the inculcation of habits of considering others.”191 The 
public’s interest in unobstructed views of Palisades Interstate Park is 
comparable to the public’s interest in traditional uses of trust property; 
interfering with the view of a trust resource is equivalent to blocking access to 
it. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its rediscovery in 1970 by the late Professor Joseph Sax, the public 
trust doctrine has continued to expand, to the dismay of its detractors and the 
delight of its adherents. This Article has explored whether the doctrine can be 
applied to the proposed construction of a building that will tower over the tree 
line of Palisades Interstate Park, where it will interfere with the public’s visual 
enjoyment of an otherwise undisturbed natural landscape and thus appropriate 
that landscape to a private use in violation of the doctrine. Answering that 
question in the affirmative, as this Article has done, takes the doctrine beyond 
its watery origins, applying it to an upland public park and to the most 
ephemeral, nonphysical use of a trust resource imaginable––its public 
observation. The Article argues that the doctrine is sufficiently malleable to 
cover this situation, given the value the public places on preserving vistas of an 
unspoiled landscape. 
 
 190.  See Rose, supra note 41, at 359 (“The main thrust of these ‘inherent public property’ 
doctrines, however, was not particularly aimed at preserving resources that we generally denote as 
environmental. Instead, the key feature of these doctrines was to reserve for the public those properties 
that the public needs for travel, communication, commerce, and to some degree public speaking—that 
is, uses that connect people with one another and with a wider world . . . .”), 360 (“[T]he public trust 
doctrine only indirectly relates to environmental resources—perhaps insofar as recreation, the 
experience of natural wonders, and the preservation of biodiversity act as a part of a liberal education, 
promote public health (including mental health), and generally enable people to interact with one 
another more productively and civilly.”). 
 191.  Rose, supra note 90, at 776. 
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In making this argument, the Article is aware of Professor Sax’s concern 
about overextending the public trust doctrine, but has tried to persuade that this 
instance of doctrinal creep fits snugly within the doctrine’s purpose and barely 
stretches beyond the perimeters of the modern doctrine. Its doctrinal leap, 
therefore, is quite modest and hopefully will not draw too much calumny.192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a 
response for our online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please 
contact ecologylawcurrents@boalt.org. Responses to articles may be viewed at 
our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq. 
